

Jews in Europe at the turn of the Millennium

Population trends and estimates

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The **Institute for Jewish Policy Research** is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to positively influence Jewish life. Its European Jewish Demography Unit exists to generate demographic data and analysis to support Jewish community planning and development throughout the continent.

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/ About this report

This report is the third issued by the European Jewish Demography Unit at the Institute for Jewish Policy Research.¹ It presents a broad overview of several aspects of the demography of Jews in Europe in a new attempt to estimate the size of Jewish populations in each country, paying attention to issues of definitions, sources and the quality of data.

Its primary purpose is to provide European Jewish community leaders and practitioners, along with those involved in supporting Jewish life across the continent, with the data and analysis they need to enhance community planning. We also trust that it will be of interest to a wide public of readers, specialists or non-specialists with an interest in the topic of Jewish demography and will be valued by researchers on European Jewry and population studies more broadly.

The general approach of this report is that Jews, irrespective of how they are defined and regardless of how actively they participate in organised Jewish community life, are deeply embedded within the reality of societies all across the European continent. Jews in Europe are not an entity isolated from society or a self-contained enclave. Rather they are shaped and influenced by the trends and processes that affect the broader societal environment of which they are part. Therefore, any understanding of European Jewish demography requires careful analysis of a broader set of internal and external variables that affect the lives and options of Jews and non-Jews alike. Moreover, this report goes beyond the common presentation of Jews in a single country, animated by the specific

hopes and fears that reflect the local situation. The frequent saying that the local situation of Jews in a given country cannot be compared with that of other countries is given short shrift when considered in the light of the broad trends unveiled by the data. Here, we look at European Jewry in a systemic way stressing the similarities, differences and interrelations that exist, and whilst we do not ignore the specific peculiarities of each place, we focus on trying to find some broader explanatory determinants of any results found.

Following a short historical survey, we address the issue of the data available and Jewish population definitions, providing some basic information on each country and territory on the continent. Attention is given to three major territorial divisions: the EU with its 27 member states; the former republics of the Soviet Union in Europe, (noting that the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are already included among the EU 27); and the balance of other countries in Europe located in part in western Europe with the prominent presence of the UK, and, in part, the Balkans.

We subsequently examine the main determinants at work in Jewish population change in the light of major general and Jewish sociodemographic indicators, and we draw some broader conclusions about the issues which may confront the future development of European Jewry. What is certain is that the size and characteristics of Jewish populations in Europe – as well as in other parts of the world – are affected by many different variables, including the demographic trends among society at large, the economic and cultural forces driving

¹ The first two reports were: Staetsky, L.D., and S. DellaPergola. 2019. *Why European Jewish Demography? A foundation paper*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Staetsky, L.D., and S. DellaPergola. 2020. *Jews in Austria: A Demographic and Social Portrait*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

international migration in or out, the political climate and the nature of interactions between Jews and non-Jews, impinging upon the amount of security and welfare available in each particular locale. Additional variables at work include the characteristics of the organised Jewish community, its ability to provide Jewish services such as physical protection, schools or religious and recreational centres, and in the final analysis, the relative strengths of the thrusts towards continuity or assimilation that may prevail in a given national and Jewish community context.

Clearly, at the present historical juncture there remain numerous difficult questions about the Jewish present and future. A survey of much larger scope than the present one would be needed to thoroughly examine the complexity of the issues at stake for Jews in Europe. While the concept of Europe may be clear in the minds of many, the geographical and cultural limits of the continent have shifted and constitute a subject for ample debate. Internal variability has been a central characteristic of the general European experience since antiquity.² This is especially true for Jews, whose continuous presence on the continent has lasted for more than 2,200 years.

Europe's political divisions make it difficult to create a homogeneous Jewish population database. Nevertheless, several studies have attempted to create such analytic frames of reference.³ This report aims to move one step forward by creating a broader and more systematic overview of the trends that affect

the Jewish presence all across the European continent. To achieve that goal, we have made use of many different databases from public and private sources: national population censuses, Jewish community registers, vital statistics from national and Jewish sources, Jewish population surveys in many European countries, data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics and perhaps most significantly, data collected through the 2018 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) survey of antisemitism.⁴ Many of the data presented here have existed for some time, but they have never been published before and some of the findings presented offer unprecedented and innovative insights into Jewish demography in Europe and beyond. References are provided throughout, and we are indebted to the many people whose work stands behind each and every one.

The operational limits of Europe adopted in this report include the conventional geographical definition of the continent from Lisbon to Vladivostok, as well as two countries sometimes classified as part of Asia. One is Cyprus, which is included as it is a member of the European Union. The other is Turkey, which has been included because a clear majority of its Jewish population lives in the European part of the country, namely the neighbourhoods of the Istanbul metropolitan area west of the Bosphorus. Similarly, the entire Russian Republic is included in our population estimates, including Jews who live in areas actually located in Asia beyond the Ural Mountains.

2 DellaPergola, S. 2006. 'Jewish Communities in Europe', in M. Jurgensmeyer (ed.) *Handbook of Global Religions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 215–221.

3 DellaPergola, S. 1983. 'Recent Demographic Trends among Jews in Western Europe', in E. Stock (ed.) *European Jewry: A Handbook*. Ramat Gan: Turtledove Press, 19–62; DellaPergola, S. 1993. 'Jews in the European community: Sociodemographic trends and challenges.' *American Jewish Year Book*, 93: 25–82. New York: American Jewish Committee; DellaPergola, S. 1994. 'An Overview of the Demographic Trends of European Jews', in J. Webber (ed.) *Jewish Identities in the New Europe*. London: The Littman Library, 57–73; Graham, D. 2004. *European Jewish identity at the Dawn of the 21st century: A working paper*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; DellaPergola, S. 2010. 'Jews in Europe: Demographic trends, contexts, outlooks,' in J. Schoeps and E. Ben-Rafael (eds.) *A road to nowhere? Jewish experiences in unifying Europe?* Leiden-Boston: Brill, 3–34; Kovács, A., and I. Barna. 2010. *Identity à la carte: Research on Jewish identities, participation and affiliation in five European countries. Analysis of survey data*. Budapest: The American Joint Distribution Committee; Staetsky, L.D., Boyd, J., Ben-Rafael, E., Cohen, E., DellaPergola, S., Dencik, L., Glöckner, O. and Kovács, A. 2013. *Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in selected EU member states*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research/Ipsos MORI (unpublished); Graham, D. 2018. *European Jewish identity: Mosaic or monolith? An empirical assessment of eight European countries*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Staetsky and DellaPergola, 2019a, cit.

4 See: FRA (2018), *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*, Luxembourg: Publications Office.

This report has no pretention to being all-inclusive or definitive in all aspects. There are many Jewish population patterns that are not dealt with here, including socioeconomic characteristics, Jewish identification and perceptions of antisemitism, all of which will be examined in future JPR publications. There are also imponderables at this stage, not least the remarkable eruption of the global coronavirus epidemic in 2020 which may entail unpredictable societal consequences for the global polity and for the Jewish minority within it. One of the challenges of future research

will be to assess what the permanent significance of this pandemic may be in the longer-term.⁵

We are grateful to a number of people who have been involved in helping to put this report together. In particular, the team at JPR, led by Jonathan Boyd who carefully reviewed the transcript and Judith Russell who edited it with her usual attention to detail. Thanks, too, to the team at Soapbox, led by Autumn Forecast, for designing the report to help make the findings as accessible as possible.

5 Staetsky, D. 2020. Jews and Coronavirus. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

1 / Europe: what, where, and for whom?

On midnight between 31 January and 1 February 2020, the United Kingdom formally seceded from the European Union in what has been popularly termed *Brexit*. This was a significant moment of change in the European geopolitical configuration, one that followed several years of lengthy debates and whose long-term impact remains to be seen. The EU, after over sixty years of growth through the incorporation of new countries – from the initial six founders of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the peak of 28 with the joining of Croatia in 2013 – contracted for the first time through the loss of one of its member states. The seceding UK was not just one member country: it was one of the three or four most populous and economically powerful ones.

Europe is no stranger to geopolitical upheavals (e.g. the collapse of communism, the reunification of Germany; the Velvet Revolution and the break-up of Czechoslovakia; civil war and genocide in Yugoslavia; the growth and expansion of the EU, and now Brexit). Some of these developments have been peacefully negotiated; others have involved bloodshed and war. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe has worked towards peace and harmony as epitomised by the EU project, and has made significant progress. Yet that advancement has suffered recently, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis. Challenges in the realms of economics and migration have been particularly acute, creating tensions at both the national and continental levels that have severely tested the bonds that have been built. Jews living in

Europe have experienced much of this, just like everyone else. But as the political climate has changed, Europe has seen revivals of political extremism on both the right and left, as well as the threat of Islamist extremism. Jews have found themselves in the crossfire more than usual, among growing perceptions of racism, xenophobia and antisemitism.⁶

These changes are of capital importance for members of the Jewish minority whose interests and aspirations have long been one of acceptance, equity and integration on a par with Europe's general societies. One of the issues at stake is the role of the hundreds of thousands, and eventually millions, of immigrants seen either as a potential economic resource, or as a serious burden for the economies of receiving nations. Another issue relates to the cultural character and cohesion of European societies, which traditionally perceived themselves as part of Christian civilisation but were now becoming grounds of religious and ethnic diversity and conflict. Such disagreements have blurred the vision of what might be expected in the future of European societies. The welfare of Jewish communities in Europe significantly depends on the answers provided to these emerging questions about the geopolitical nature of Europe in general and of the European Union in particular.

When one tries to assess the current status of Jewish populations and communities in Europe, Jewish citizens are affected by these changes and debates alongside everyone else living on the

6 FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2018a. *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism – Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

continent.⁷ The primary concern for Jews, as for many others, has long focused on the need for political and economic stability in Europe in general, and in the EU in particular. Historically, Jews favoured and were favoured by multinational structures that were non-exclusive and culturally non-committal. Clearly, on this account, the Jews – as with any other sector of European society – shared and were bound to be affected by the more general trends emerging, for better or worse. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European Union has constituted the main area of Jewish residence, and hence an influential frame of reference for Jews not only in Europe but also globally. Under these circumstances, the nature and quality of the interaction between Jewish minorities and national majorities within European societies become of paramount importance.



The primary concern for Jews, as for many others, has long focused on the need for political and economic stability in Europe in general, and in the EU in particular

The crucial issue is whether or not a tolerant and pluralistic environment can be created across the European continent, within the EU and outside it, where the various component national and religious cultures can be recognised as equally legitimate and where minority cultures not defined by a specific territory can obtain the same recognition and legitimacy as the territorially based majorities. How will Jews in Europe fare as they seem to be caught between the two opposing challenges of latent – and sometimes very real – hostility on the part of the surrounding society, on the one hand, and benign acceptance by society and assimilation into it, on the other?

What then, is the degree of trust toward the EU on the part of its Jewish citizens?


Attachment to the European Union

The nature of the relationship between Jews and the European Union is outlined in Figure 1 based on the results of the 2018 FRA Survey of the experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among European Jews. Eurobarometer 2018 results are used for the national populations to which Jews are compared. In both surveys, the respondents were asked how attached they felt to the European Union.

When seen through the lens of feelings of attachment, Jewish Europe is clearly divided into two blocks. In most of Western Europe (the eight countries at the bottom of the exhibit), a ‘very strong’ attachment to the EU is a minority sentiment: 8%–21% of Jews feel this way. The level of attachment among Jews is only barely higher than that found among the national populations. The situation is different in Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland), where about half of all Jews feel very strongly attached to the EU versus less than 20% in the respective national populations. Austria and Italy show an intermediate pattern: the proportion of Jews strongly attached to the EU is smaller than in the two former Communist countries but it is significantly higher than in the respective national populations. The reasons behind these patterns, shown here for the first time, should be understood considerably better than they are at present. The educational profiles of Jews and non-Jews, the characteristics of national identity in each country and the country origins of local Jewish populations are all good possible explanations, and they deserve further analysis. In the meantime, the main ‘take home’ lesson is that the degree of attachment towards

7 For general treatments see e.g.: Webber, J., ed. 1994. *Jewish identities in the New Europe*. London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization; Wasserstein, B. 1997. *Vanishing Diaspora. The Jews in Europe since 1945*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Gitelman, Z., B. Kosmin, and A. Kovács. 2003. *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond*. Budapest: CEU Press; J. Schoeps and E. Ben-Rafael (eds.) *A road to nowhere? Jewish experiences in unifying Europe*. Leiden-Boston: Brill; Pardo, S. and H. Zahavi, eds. 2019. *Jewish Contribution to European Integration*. New York: Lexington Books.

Figure 1. Degree of attachment of Jews and other Europeans to the European Union in 12 EU countries, 2018, percentages



Note: A 5-point scale was used to measure Jewish opinion compared to a 4-point scale used to measure general opinion. A 5-point scale tends to produce more conservative estimates, and so we are led to the conclusion that Jewish levels of attachment are slightly underreported.

Source: 2018 FRA Survey, weighted data; Eurobarometer 2019, <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>

the EU features marked differences across countries, and while in some places the differences between Jews and non-Jews are trivial, in others they are very prominent.


Meaning of Jewishness in Europe

In the public and civic context just outlined, and in the framework of a general revival of national and religious identities, the predicament of Jewish identification becomes more acute. Jews, in fact, face a double issue. On the one hand, there is the issue of defining the boundaries of the collective as epitomised by the question of *Who is a Jew?* This does not only carry

symbolic and cultural implications, but directly determines the size of the population at stake – as will be discussed later in greater detail. But on the other hand, and no less significant, is the issue of *What does it mean to be a Jew? How is Jewish identity manifested today?* The multiple answers offered in this respect point to a very complex collective sometimes held together by an abundant consensus of shared feelings and interests, but at other times better characterised by internal disagreement (see Figure 2).

Besides the widely shared quest for the enjoyment of civil rights and peaceful interaction between members of the Jewish minority and the majority European society, one central feature of the contemporary Jewish experience

Figure 2. Primary meaning of Jewishness in 12 EU Countries, 2018, percentages



Source: 2018 FRA Survey, weighted data.

to be stressed is that the substantive meaning of Jewishness may be different among Jewish populations in different countries. Figure 2 demonstrates how Jewish respondents in the 12 countries analysed by the 2018 FRA survey expressed their main mode of attachment to Judaism.

There is a wide range of variation in the emphasis placed by Jews in different countries on each of the various options that exist to express Jewish identification. All the options were represented among Jews in each country. Jews in the UK are most likely to say that religion is the main factor in defining their Jewish identity (over 60%). They were followed, in order, by Jews in Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Denmark. Jews in Poland, followed by Jews in the Netherlands and Sweden, viewed ethnicity

as the prime component of their Jewish identity. In Hungary, the prime factor was Jewish culture. Some degree of polarisation between Jews in Western and Eastern Europe is noticeable here as well. In Eastern Europe the place of religion in Jewish identity is clearly secondary to ethnicity and culture. Jews in different Western European countries are not homogeneous either in this respect, but everywhere the role of religion is more prominent than in Eastern Europe. Other defining components of Jewish identity mentioned in each country were parentage, heritage, upbringing, and 'other' (i.e. something else). Clearly the symbolic sphere of Jewish identity and the demographic dimension of Jewish population size and growth or decline are not the same. A significant interrelation exists nonetheless between these different aspects, and this will be discussed later in this report.

2 / Retrospective Jewish population trends


The long historical view

Jews have not only been an integral part of European history and culture but are actually one of its oldest and original component groups. However, throughout history, the inherent weakness of a landless and powerless minority vis-à-vis territorially based societies and their constituted powers often put the Jews in a condition of dependency and instability, and translated into powerful ups and downs in the Jewish presence. Quantitatively, what is more remarkable in the European Jewish *longue durée* is its shifting rather than stationary geography.⁸ In fact, a powerful historical factor ceaselessly at work was the competition of several major European powers for hegemony over the continent and outside of it. This entailed repeated conflicts, rises and falls of the centres of political influence and of economic primacy, and significant variations and differences in the nature of local circumstances in each nation. Among the factors to be considered in this last respect was the attitude towards local Jewish populations. This ranged from tolerance at certain conjunctures of time and place (such as in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during the seventeenth century, the Habsburg Empire at the end of the eighteenth, and even occasionally

parts of the Ottoman Empire), to very oppressive under other circumstances, namely at the times of the expulsions from regions or countries (most notoriously from Spain in 1492) and during the fascist and Nazi hegemony over large parts of Europe during the twentieth century.

Powerfully stimulated by these different attitudes, voluntary or coerced international migrations played a major role in the continuous redistribution of Jewish populations within the European continent and in ceaseless population exchanges between Europe and other continents. In a long-term perspective that spans over a millennium, the main chronology of Jewish migrations in Europe was South-North initially, then West-East, only later East-West, and again South-North. The impact of the latter stages was very significant in shaping the contemporary European Jewish reality, but the earlier stages cannot be ignored as the necessary prelude to the overall picture. Following these large-scale movements, Jews often quickly absorbed the fundamental mores of their new place and tended to incorporate them within their unique, pre-existing or recently acquired Jewish identity.

8 Ruppin, A. 1913. *The Jews of To-day*. New York: Henry Holt (transl. M. Bentwich); Lestschinsky, J. 1926. Probleme der Bevölkerungsbewegung bei den Juden. *Metron*, 6, 1–157; Lestschinsky, J. 1929–1930. Die Umsiedlung und Umschichtung des jüdischen Volkes im Laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 30, 123–156, and 32, 563–599; Ruppin, A. 1940. *The Jewish Fate and Future*. London: Macmillan; Schmelz, U.O. 1970. A guide to Jewish population studies, in U.O. Schmelz and P. Glikson (eds.) *Jewish Population Studies 1961–1968*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 13–94; Bachi, R. 1976. *Population Trends of World Jewry*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University; Bachi, R. 1976. *The Population of Israel*. Paris: CICRED, and Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; DellaPergola, S. 2001. Some fundamentals of Jewish demographic history, in S. DellaPergola and J. Even (eds.) *Papers in Jewish demography 1997*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 11–33; DellaPergola, S. 1999. *World Jewry beyond 2000: Demographic prospects*. Oxford: Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies; Schmelz, U.O., and S. DellaPergola. 2006. Demography, *Encyclopedia Judaica*, 2nd ed., Vol. 5. Farmington Hills, MI: Thompson Gale, 553–572; DellaPergola, S. 2011. *Jewish demographic policies: Population trends and options in Israel and in the diaspora*. Jerusalem: Jewish People Policy Institute.

Figure 3. World Jewish population by major geographical areas, 1170–2020, thousands

Source: DellaPergola, 2001, cit.; DellaPergola, S. 2021. *World Jewish Population 2020*, in A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin (eds.) *American Jewish Year Book 2020*. Cham: Springer (forthcoming).

Figure 3 presents a visual impression of the growth and changing geographic distribution of the Jewish population worldwide between the end of the twelfth century up to 2020. During the centuries from the early Middle Ages to the beginning of the modern era, the global Jewish population amounted to roughly one million people in total, and featured little, if any, demographic growth. However, between the end of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the number of Jews in the world climbed dramatically to over 10 million, and on the eve of the Second World War, the point of maximum growth ever reached, the global Jewish population was

estimated at 16.5 million. This momentous demographic transition primarily occurred in Europe, and mostly in the Eastern regions of the continent.⁹

As a result, and notwithstanding the development of Jewish communities elsewhere, the world Jewish Diaspora became predominantly associated and identified with Europe. Reflecting the spread of enlightenment and emancipation processes across Europe, leading thinkers and ideas in the Jewish religious and civic realms initially came from Western and Central Europe, before reaching Eastern Europe; by the late

9 Lestschinsky, J. 1948. *Crisis, Catastrophe and Survival*. New York: World Jewish Congress; DellaPergola, S. 1996. Between Science and Fiction: Notes on the Demography of the Holocaust, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 10, 1, 34–51. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. DellaPergola, S. 2014. Reflections on the Multinational Geography of Jews after World War II, in F. Ouzan and M. Garstenfeld (eds.) *Displacement, Migration and Integration: A Comparative Approach to Jewish Migrants and Refugees in the Post-War period*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 13–33.

nineteenth century, many of the most important developments that occurred in the religious, social, cultural and political realms actually had the dominant imprint of Eastern European Jewry. This significantly reflected the eastward shift of the geographical centre of gravity of the Jewish population and the critical mass of Jewish life that had occurred over the previous centuries.

Figure 3 also demonstrates the gradual disassociation of world Jewish population growth from Eastern Europe during the last decades of the nineteenth century and until the Second World War. The first stage of disassociation preceded the Shoah and was predominantly shaped by the population pressures in Europe. Much like other groups in Europe, Jews migrated from the continent, albeit with greater intensity. Indeed, in the years 1899–1924, Jews comprised one tenth of all migrants to the United



Much like other groups in Europe, Jews migrated from the continent, albeit with greater intensity

States of America, lower than the proportion of Italians, but at a broadly comparable level to Poles and Germans.¹⁰ The rise of the North American Jewish community, and to a lesser extent of the Jewish communities in other overseas countries and in the Land of Israel/Palestine, became the dominant factor of a changing geographical distribution. It should be stressed that the extension of the Jewish Diaspora to new continents and areas was fundamentally fuelled by large scale migrations from Europe, so that Jews of European origin continued to represent the dominant element globally and especially in the Diaspora.

Jews in Europe had grown to constitute 88% of world Jewry in 1880 (13% living in Western Europe and 75% in Eastern Europe), and in 1900 their share was 83% (11% and 72%, respectively). Even after the large emigration to the Americas, they remained the majority of the world's Jewish population in 1939 – about 58% of the whole, of whom 8% were based in Western Europe and 50% in Eastern Europe.

The Shoah brought about a dramatic diminution of the world's Jewish population to an estimated 11 million in 1945.¹¹ Because of its consequences, the weight of European Jewry sharply diminished after the Second World War, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In addition, Jewish communities in Islamic countries in Asia and North Africa virtually disappeared through intensive emigration. By contrast, Jewish communities especially in North America and Oceania experienced some growth, but those in Latin America remained stable overall or declined somewhat. The *yishuv* (settlement) in Israel rapidly increased and became the other main centre of Jewish presence, and indeed the primary centre by the turn of the twenty-first century. The demographic factors that contributed to the static or declining share of Jews in Europe in the global picture will be discussed below.

Over the course of time, one can observe that various geopolitical regions in Europe rose and fell as the most significant areas of Jewish settlement. After the great expulsion of Jews from Spain and Portugal, growth was felt initially in Central Europe's western parts (Germany, Austria, also inclusive of Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium) and eastern parts (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania). The spectacular total continental growth during the nineteenth century, followed by the more catastrophic consequences of the Shoah, particularly affected the complex of Poland, the Baltic States, Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine

10 See Hersch, L. 1931. International migration of the Jews. *International Migrations*, Vol. 2: *Interpretations*. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER): 471–520.

11 Total losses due to the Shoah are realistically estimated at about 6 million. During the Second World War, the Jewish populations in areas not affected by the Shoah grew by an estimated half a million. See Lestschinsky, 1948, cit.; DellaPergola 1996, cit.

and Bessarabia (later partly superseded by Moldavia). Migrations from the western to the eastern regions of Europe initially played a remarkable role in creating a viable critical mass of Jewish populations. However, most Jewish population growth reflected high rates of natural increase determined primarily by lower than average death rates, along with the persistence of relatively high birth rates. At a later stage, the flow of Jewish international migration was again reversed and East to West migrations determined the growth of North-Western Europe (the UK and Scandinavia), and France. Other European Jewish communities such as Italy and the Balkans also experienced significant quantitative ups and downs over history but never constituted the main locus of the Jewish presence in Europe.


Summing up, at the time of writing, the proportion of Jews residing in Europe is about the same as it was at the time of the first Jewish global population account conducted by Benjamin of Tudela, a Jewish medieval traveler, in 1170 (Figure 4).

Table 1 compares in greater detail the internal shifts of Jewish population distribution inside

Europe and the shifting regional primacy by major countries or groups of countries between 1939 and 2020. The continent is here subdivided between the two conventionally used parts of Western and Eastern Europe.

The Shoah determined the most powerful cleavage in modern Jewish history and radically disrupted what had been up to that moment the continuous build-up and transformation of European Jewry.¹² While the demographic consequences of the Shoah are not discussed here in detail, it must be kept in mind that its after-effects long impacted upon Jewish population composition and trends. They still powerfully determine the meaning of Jewish communal life in contemporary Europe in various ways. By 1945 the European share of world Jewry had fallen to 35%, and it fell further to 26% in 1970 and to 9% in 2020. The percent decline was nearly exclusively felt in Eastern Europe, whose share of the global total diminished from 26% in 1945 to 17% in 1970 to 2% in 2020. Western Europe kept its share of global Jewry relatively more constant, from 9% in 1945 to 7% in 2020.

Figure 4. Proportion of Jews living in Europe out of total Jewish population, 1170–2020, percentages



Source: Figure 3.

12 DellaPergola, 1996, cit.

These dramatic population shifts suggest that the overarching concept of Europe cannot hold in Jewish terms without referring separately to its parts. Very significant internal dissonance

is demonstrated by the fact that besides the shared catastrophic effects of the Shoah, the decline of one part of the continent often underpinned the rise of another part.

Table 1. Core Jewish population distribution, 1939–2020, thousands

Country	1939	1945	1970	2020	% Difference 1970–2020
World, total	16,500	11,000	12,645	14,787	16.9
Europe, total	9,500	3,800	3,232	1,329	-58.9
Europe as % of world	58	35	26	9	-64.8
Western Europe, total	1,350	944	1,112	1,017	-8.5
West Europe as % of world	8	9	9	7	-21.8
Portugal, Spain, Gibraltar	6	9	10	17	70.0
France	320	180	530	449	-15.3
Italy	47	29	32	27	-15.6
Switzerland	19	25	20	18	-10.0
Austria	60	7	8	10	25.0
Germany	195	45	30	118	293.3
Belgium, Luxembourg	93	32	34	29	-14.7
Netherlands	141	33	30	30	0.0
United Kingdom, Ireland	345	350	395	295	-25.3
Scandinavia	17	24	23	24	4.3
Displaced persons	107	210	0	0	-
Eastern Europe, total	8,150	2,856	2,120	312	-85.3
East Europe as % of world	50	26	17	2	-87.4
Poland	3,225	100	9	5	-44.4
Baltics	253	66	66	9	-86.4
Byelorussia	375	147	148	8	-94.6
Russia	903	860	808	155	-80.8
Ukraine, Moldova	1,863	916	875	47	-94.6
Czech Republic, Slovakia	357	42	14	7	-50.0
Hungary	404	180	70	47	-32.9
Romania	520	430	70	9	-87.1
Bulgaria	50	45	7	2	-71.4
Yugoslavia	75	12	7	4	-42.9
Greece	75	8	7	4	-42.9
Turkey	50	50	39	15	-61.5

Source: Schmelz and DellaPergola, 2006, cit.; DellaPergola, 2021, *American Jewish Year Book*, cit.

Jewish population changes in Europe since the Second World War

Three political events impacted on European Jewish history since the Second World War: the establishment and consolidation of the State of Israel, the retreat of colonialism from Africa and Asia and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. These events served as push factors behind the large-scale Jewish migration that both took Jews away from Europe and added them to it, yet in the net outcome, took away more than it added.

Jews and non-Jews in post-war Europe reached an advanced stage of demographic transition, which means that their fertility was low, at times below the level necessary for population replacement, while their longevity was high. The natural change in the European Jewish population (i.e. the balance of births and deaths) was such that it could, at the most, keep Jewish populations in a numerically stable condition but not generate vigorous growth. This situation eventually changed somewhat, through some fertility increase in certain European Jewish communities, but this development only became visible at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Between the end of the Second World War and 1967

After the Second World War international migration again played a very important role in the redistribution of Europe's Jewish population. Great migration streams occurred in both directions, leaving and reaching Europe. Soon after the war, large numbers of Jews who were temporarily based in Displaced Persons camps as a consequence of the conflict and the Shoah for the most part left the continent, primarily for Israel and to some extent for other Western countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States. The largest European Jewish

population was in the Soviet Union from where there was little opportunity to emigrate. Highly variable migration policies were implemented by other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, but eventually most Jews left those countries. In Western Europe the opposite occurred. The French decolonisation in particular, but also the retreat of the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands from their former colonies, protectorates and metropolitan territories in North Africa and to a lesser extent in Asia, generated wide waves of emigration among Jewish national subjects, as well as among Jews with other or no citizenship who often had roots in those areas going back many generations.

In many places in Africa and Asia, as well as in Europe, Jews had often played a middleman economic and social role between the colonial powers and the local populations, and under the new circumstances they found themselves in an endangered position that prompted them to leave as soon as possible and nearly in their entirety. In addition to anti-Jewish hostility that to some extent had pre-existed, a crucial factor was the ignition of the conflict between the Arab countries and Israel. Jews, rightly or wrongly, were perceived as identified with the Israeli enemy and became the target of violence. The complex interaction that they had built up with the non-Jewish environment over hundreds of years abruptly collapsed. The natural resort for those who did not choose to go to Israel was to resettle in the former colonial country of which many held citizenship.¹³ The large scale migration of Jews from the former colonies and other dependencies in the 1950s and particularly the 1960s led France to become the largest Jewish community in Europe. Visible Jewish minorities settled in other countries throughout Europe, such as Italy, Belgium, Spain and the UK.

Between 1948 and 1968, it can be estimated that over 620,000 Jews migrated from Eastern

13 Bensimon, D., and S. DellaPergola. 1984. *La population juive de France: sociodémographie et identité*. Paris: CNRS, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; DellaPergola, S. 1975. The Italian Jewish Population Study: Demographic Characteristics and Trends, in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S.J. Gould (eds.) *Studies in Jewish Demography: Survey for 1969–1971*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 60–97.

Europe, of whom over half a million went to Israel.¹⁴ Most of the remainder settled outside of Europe and only a minority settled in Western Europe. During the same period, over 250,000 Jews immigrated to France from North Africa and up to 50,000 to other parts of Western Europe. Overall, between 1948 and 1970, the Jewish population of Europe decreased by 14%, increasing by 8% in Western Europe but diminishing by 22% in Eastern Europe.



Between 1970 and 2020, Europe lost 59% of its Jewish population. In Western Europe there was a moderate loss of 9%, and in Eastern Europe a drastic decline of 85%

After 1967

After the June 1967 Six Day War, emigration from Western Europe to Israel became more significant. But the main event was the opening of the doors of the Soviet Union that took place in two distinct stages. The first occurred soon after the 1967 war as the plight of Soviet Jews, denied the right to emigrate by Soviet authorities, came more and more to the fore of Western public opinion. The second stage was put into motion by the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, which symbolically marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union. Between 1969 and 2020, over 1.8 million Jews left Eastern Europe, and of these, over one million went to Israel. Of the remainder, over 120,000, plus an equal number of non-Jewish family members went to Germany, although the relative majority went to the US. Over 100,000 Jewish immigrants came to Europe from other areas of origin, including Israel. The total continental migration balance was clearly negative, causing a sharp decline in the total number of European Jews.

Indeed, between 1970 and 2020, Europe lost 59% of its Jewish population. In Western Europe there was a moderate loss of 9%, and in Eastern Europe a drastic decline of 85%.¹⁵ The pace of Jewish population change was quite different across different countries too. Between 1970 and 2020, Germany incurred the highest relative increase, growing by a factor of nearly four. The relatively small Jewish populations in Iberian countries (Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar) increased by 70%, and in Austria by 25%. Scandinavian countries were stable overall, but Italy, France and the complex of other communities in Western Europe (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland) all experienced some diminution. The most visible decline, estimated at 25%, occurred in the UK. In Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Central-Eastern European areas altogether lost 58% of their population in 1970, and the former Soviet republics in Europe lost 82%.

As a consequence of these changes the ranking of major Jewish populations in Europe repeatedly shifted. Between 1948 and 2020, only five countries appeared consistently among the largest ten: France, Russia, Ukraine, the UK and Hungary. Belarus, Moldova, Romania, Latvia and Turkey disappeared from the list of countries hosting the ten largest Jewish populations. Countries that made their way into the top ten list instead comprised Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. The largest Jewish population in a single European country in 1945 was Russia (860,000), diminished to 808,000 in 1970 (still Russia). In 2020 it was France, with less than 450,000. The tenth largest in 1948 was Latvia (37,000), in 1970 it was the Netherlands (30,000), and in 2020 it was Switzerland (18,500). These figures clearly demonstrate how European Jewry has been shrinking.

Notwithstanding its much reduced population size, European Jewry tended to become

14 DellaPergola, S. 1998. The Global Context of Migration to Israel, in E. Leshem and J.T. Shuval (eds.) *Immigration to Israel: Sociological Perspectives, Studies of Israeli Society*, Vol 8. New Brunswick-London: Transaction, 51–92; DellaPergola, S. 2009, International migration of Jews, in E. Ben-Rafael and Y. Sternberg (eds.) *Transnationalism: Diasporas and the advent of a new (dis)order*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 213–236.


15 DellaPergola, 2021, cit.

geographically somewhat more concentrated. In 1948 the ten major countries included 85% of the total Jewish population in Europe; in 1970, the share of the ten largest had increased to 89.5%, and in 2020 it was 88%. These changes also meant a drastic shift in the Jewish population's centre of gravity from the East to the West of the continent. Clearly, the main change was determined by the exodus from the former Soviet Union, while EU member countries, as an aggregate, remained quite stable overall. The main beneficiary of such large scale migration, as noted, was Germany (Table 1). In sum: about four centuries after Western European Jewry lost its predominance over Eastern European Jewry, the West regained the position that it had previously held from the beginning of Jewish settlement on the European continent in antiquity until the seventeenth century.

Figures 5 and 6 summarise the data in Table 1, stressing in particular the population changes that occurred after the Shoah and the Second World War.


Table 2 summarises the main changes in the distribution of Europe's Jewish population during the fifty-year period between 1970 and 2020. For the purpose of comparison, the three geographical divisions consistently reflect the situation in 2020, with the Baltics included in the EU and the UK excluded. The general Jewish population decline in Europe which has already been noted was felt overwhelmingly in the former Soviet republics (a negative balance of over 1.6 million, or -88% of the Jewish population in 1970), and to a much lesser extent in the EU countries (minus 156,000, or -17%) and in the other countries of the European continent (minus

Figure 5. Proportion of Jews living in Europe out of the global Jewish population, 1939–2020, percentages



Source: Table 1.

Figure 6. Proportion of Jews living in Western and Eastern Europe out of the total in Europe, 1939–2020, percentages



Source: Table 1.

Table 2. Core Jewish population changes in Europe 1970–2020*

Area	Number		% of world Jewry		1970–2020	
	1970	2020	1970	2020	Difference	% change
Total Europe	3,231,900	1,329,400	25.6	9.0	-1,902,500	-59
EU 27	941,050	788,800	7.5	5.4	-152,250	-16
FSU	1,831,100	210,400	14.5	1.4	-1,620,700	-89
Other	459,750	330,200	3.6	2.2	-129,550	-28
Thereof: UK	390,000	292,000	3.1	2.0	-98,000	-25
Rest	69,750	38,200	0.5	0.2	-31,550	-45

*Baltic states included in EU; UK excluded.

Source: Table 1.

130,000, or -28%). Among the latter group of countries, the UK diminished by 98,000 (-25%) and the remaining smaller communities diminished by about 32,000 (-46%).

After a century and a half of inter- and intra-continental migrations, physical destructions, Jewish community reconstructions and shifts

in the leading patterns of Jewish identification, it was evident that the fate and experiences of European Jews had a huge impact on the global profile of world Jewry. It is also clear that the contemporary presence of Jews of European origin is much more significant in the large areas of emigration – the Americas and Israel – than in the old continent itself.¹⁶

16 DellaPergola, S. 2003. *Review of Relevant Demographic Information on World Jewry*. Report submitted to The International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

3 / Current Jewish population estimates in Europe

Jewish communities in Europe and the data predicament


The main frame of reference to collective life in Europe has long been the states where Jews lived – whether national or multi-national. Therefore, Jewish life was mainly patterned according to the different national experiences. Western European Jews were historically tolerated, discriminated against, and eventually emancipated in the framework of broad political and cultural processes connected with the modern evolution of national identities in each country. In the modern period, Jews were mostly recognised as a distinct religious group *vis-à-vis* the majority's society. Jewish community representative institutions were typically those of a religious group. The alternative possible definition along ethnic-national criteria was not conceivable in the ethnocentric and quite monolithic cultural framework which prevailed in most Western national states. In the French tradition, which was to exert deep influences throughout the continent, Jews were, indeed, granted equal civil rights as individuals, not as a communal group. In Eastern Europe, and most remarkably in the former Soviet Union, Jews came to be recognised as an ethnic-national group. These short notes help to explain the differences in Jewish community organisation – or the lack thereof – that have prevailed across the continent during the twentieth century and beyond.

The importance of these basic differences cannot be understated when it comes to the availability

of demographic data about Jews in Europe. Such data are collected primarily by public authorities and/or by the Jewish community, and both their existence or not, and the main definitional framework within which Jewish populations had to fit, crucially depended on the basic attitude of the state toward religious and ethno-national identities – and toward the Jews in particular.

The complex pattern of documentation available on Jewish populations in Europe has been discussed at length in the first report of JPR's European Jewish Demography Unit and will not be repeated here.¹⁷ In brief, some countries have population censuses or national population registers as well as vital statistical systems (concerning marriages and divorces, births, burials and sometimes international migration) which provide data on Jews, defined either by religion or by ethnicity. Most countries, however, do not have those resources. Moreover, in some European countries (e.g. Austria and Switzerland) a movement away from the traditional census took place due to mounting methodological and logistical difficulties. Data on religion in general, and Jewishness in particular, were no longer collected in the aftermath of the changes in census methodology, with clear negative consequences for Jewish demography and social statistics. On the other hand, some Jewish communities have a central register of members and vital statistics records, although this is not

17 Staetsky and DellaPergola, 2019a, cit.

Figure 7. Percent of Jewish community affiliated among Jews in 12 EU countries, 2018

Source: 2018 FRA Survey, unweighted data.

Independent: Austria: based on the membership counts of Jewish communities supplied by Jewish umbrella communal organisation, see Staetsky, L.D. and DellaPergola, S. 2020. *Jews in Austria: a demographic and social portrait*. JPR European Jewish Demography Unit. Belgium: affiliation data were estimated separately for the two major cities and finally weighted nationally. Proportion of adult individuals affiliated to a synagogue, based on (1) the counts of strictly Orthodox households available in communal telephone directories supplied by Professor Thomas Gergely; (2) total Belgian Jewish population size as in DellaPergola, S. 2017. *World Jewish Population 2016*. Current Jewish Population Reports, 17–2016, and (3) FRA 2018 survey. France: proportion of adult individuals who took part in Jewish communal life in 2002, see Cohen E. 2009. *The Jews of France at the Turn of the Third Millennium: a sociological and cultural analysis*. Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University, The Rappaport Center for Assimilation Research and Strengthening Jewish Vitality. Germany: proportion of adult individuals affiliated to Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat), see Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland ZWST. 2017. *Mitgliederstatistik der jüdischen Gemeinden und Landesverbände in Deutschland für das Jahr 2016*. Frankfurt am Main: ZWST. Hungary: proportion of adult individual members in a religious Jewish community, based on a survey of Hungarian Jewish population, see Kovács, A. and Barna, I. 2018. *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017-ben. Egy zörsociológiai kutatás eredményei*. Budapest: Szombat, p.181. Italy: proportion of individuals (all ages) members of a Jewish community, Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane. 2018. *Riepilogo Censimento Comunità al 31 dicembre 2017*. Roma: Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane. Netherlands: proportion of adult individuals affiliated to a synagogue, based on the 1999 survey of the Dutch Jewish population, see Van Solinge, H., and De Vries, M. 2001. *De Joden in Nederland anno 2000*. Demografische profiel en binding aan het Jodendom. Amsterdam: Aksant. Poland: based on assessments of affiliation of adult individuals according to: (1) JDC International Centre for Community Development. 2011. *Identity à la Carte. Research on Jewish identities, participation and affiliation in five Eastern European countries*, (2) assessment of membership size of Jewish communities in Poland by the umbrella Jewish communal organisation. Spain: based on Berthelot, Martine. 2009. *El Judaísmo en la España actual*, in *Revista Española de Sociología* 12, 67–83. Sweden and Denmark: proportion of adult individuals affiliated to umbrella Jewish communal organisation, based on membership counts of Jewish communities conducted under the supervision of Professor Lars Dencik in 2018. UK: proportion of households affiliated to a synagogue as per the 2026 synagogue membership survey, see Casale Mashiah, D. and Boyd, J. 2017. *Synagogue membership in the United Kingdom in 2016*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

the case in most countries. A higher share of Jewish affiliation entails a greater likelihood that the Jewish community owns membership records and data on their demographic changes. Lower affiliation rates entail a reliance on estimates of lower quality, unless other sources can fill the void. Jewish population estimates can critically rely on those sources but, in their absence, must be obtained via other means.

An illustration of the affiliation status of Jewish populations in different countries is provided in Figure 7, which shows the variable percentage of Jews attached to Jewish community organisations. Two sets of data are reported: affiliation rates to any Jewish organisation according to the 2018 FRA survey, and independently assessed affiliation rates based on a variety of different sources in each country. Wide differences appear in the percentages of affiliation of Jews with their Jewish community organisations in 12 EU countries.¹⁸ In some cases, such as Italy, Germany, Austria, and to a somewhat lesser extent France, Belgium and Hungary, the two sets of data match. In the other countries (the UK, Spain, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark) very substantial gaps appear according to the different sources.

In countries such as Italy, Germany and Austria, central or local Jewish community organisations effectively cover the vast majority of the known Jewish population (70–80%) and also keep relatively well-organised and updated Jewish community registers. Belgium, with a similar estimated level of affiliation, is different: because of the divided character of the Jewish population between the more secular centre in Brussels and the more traditional one in Antwerp, no dominant central body can really claim control of the whole Jewish public. In France, the estimated affiliation rate does not refer to the central Jewish community institutions but rather measures a more generic rate of involvement

and participation in Jewish community activities. In former Communist countries (Hungary and Poland), in Northern Europe (the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) and in the UK, the independently assessed level of community affiliation appears to be much lower, but this may depend on the tendency of the FRA 2018 survey in these countries to overrepresent the communally affiliated Jews.

Who is a Jew? Defining Jewish populations¹⁹

In this and the following section we review the issue of defining Jewish populations for social research purposes, and the nature and quality of available sources. The details about the type of sources and the quality of the estimates used in this report appear in Table A1 in Appendix A.

A first distinction is between *normative* and *operational* definitions. The former rely on juridical principles reflecting traditional Jewish law (*halachah*), on alternative rulings by religious authorities of Jewish progressive movements, or on different paradigms from non-Jewish sources (as was the case in Nazi censuses in Europe). By the traditional, normative ruling, a Jew is *anyone who was born of a Jewish mother or was converted to Judaism by a Jewish court*. Other Jewish rulings recognise *patrilineality* as well as *matrilineality*. *Normative* definitions provide absolute theoretical criteria, but they are virtually impossible to implement in empirical work in the social sciences because, in theory, one should verify the personal status and background of all humankind before reaching conclusions about the Jewish population worldwide. Therefore, *operational* definition criteria are usually adopted for research purposes, reflecting decisions made by researchers. Four such criteria are outlined here, covering a population whose order of magnitude progressively grows.

18 The UK is included as one of these twelve countries here as it was a member of the EU at the time of the survey.

19 This and the following section reproduce with minor changes the text of DellaPergola, S. 2020. World Jewish Population 2019, in A. Dashefsky and I. Sheskin (eds.) *American Jewish Year Book*, 119. Cham: Springer.

Core Jewish population (CJP)

In most Diaspora countries, the core Jewish population²⁰ includes all people who, when asked in a sociodemographic survey, identify themselves as Jews, *or* who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not profess another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, significantly overlaps with, but does not perfectly coincide with *halachah* (Jewish law). Almost 95% of people who identified as Jews by birth in the 2018 FRA survey also stated that their mother was Jewish either by birth (90%) or by conversion (5%); only 5% described themselves as Jews by birth yet stated that their mother was not Jewish. Inclusion in the core Jewish population does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behaviour concerning religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria. Some do not even identify themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity, they are included. All these people are considered to be part of the *core* Jewish population, which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without formal conversion and do not hold another identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons who state being partly Jewish along with another religious identity, and those of Jewish origin who, in censuses or sociodemographic surveys, explicitly identify

with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted. The *core* population concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options offered by many available demographic data sources.



The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who do not identify by religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or other cultural criteria. Some do not even identify themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity, they are included

In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or sociodemographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to Ministry of the Interior rulings, which rely on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court.²¹ In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, *and* not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

20 A concept initially suggested by Kosmin, B.A., S. Goldstein, J. Waksberg, N. Lerer, A. Keysar, and J. Scheckner. 1991. *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*. New York: Council of Jewish Federations.

21 Corinaldi, M. 1998. Jewish identity, Chapter 2 in M. Corinaldi (ed.) *Jewish identity: The case of Ethiopian Jewry*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press; Corinaldi, M. 2018. *Who is a Jew. "Beta Israel": from Ethiopian Exile to Return to Zion*. Tel Aviv: Law Books Publishing House (Hebrew).

Jewish parent(s) population (PJP)

A major research issue is whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities.

A category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) was introduced by the US National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) of 2000–01.²² Some PJBs were included in the final Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. The 2013 Pew Research Center's *A Portrait of Jewish Americans*,²³ introduced the concept of people who are *partly Jewish*, a definition not previously tested empirically. This helped to clarify the demographic picture, but also made the debate about definitions more complicated, and the comparison of results more ambivalent. Emerging from these more recent research developments, the concept of total population with at least one Jewish parent includes the core Jewish population, plus anyone currently not identifying as exclusively Jewish but with one or two Jewish parents. In the Pew 2013 survey, the total population with Jewish parents besides the core comprised two sub-groups: (a) people who report no religion, and declare they are partly Jewish; and (b) people who report not being Jewish, and declare a Jewish background because they had a Jewish parent (Pew Research Center 2013).

Enlarged Jewish population (EJP)

The enlarged Jewish population²⁴ further expands by including the sum of: (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they are *partly Jewish*; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who, by *core* Jewish population criteria, are *not* currently Jewish; (d) all other non-Jews with Jewish background more distant than a Jewish parent;

and (e) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews with a Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) people who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may also claim to be Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way; and (b) other people with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households.

Law of Return population (LRP)

The Law of Return population reflects Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants. The Law of Return awards new Jewish immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and the Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the Law of Return,²⁵ a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of Jewish religious denomination), and who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for Law of Return purposes, although the same person may still belong to the *population with Jewish parents*. Thus, all the Falash Mura – a group of Ethiopian non-Jews with Jewish ancestry – must undergo conversion to be eligible for the Law of Return. The law itself does not affect a person's Jewish status – which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior relying on Israel's rabbinic authorities – but only for the specific

22 See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013.

23 Pew Research Center. 2013. *A portrait of Jewish Americans: Findings from a Pew research center survey of U.S. Jews*. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.

24 A concept initially suggested by DellaPergola, 1975, cit.

25 Gavison, R. 2009. *60 years to the law of return: History, ideology, justification*. Jerusalem: Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanistic Thought; Harpaz, Y., and B. Herzog. 2018. *Report on Citizenship Law: Israel*. S. Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.

immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the Law of Return. Articles 1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to *all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren*, as well as to *their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses*. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the Law of Return applies to a large population – the so-called *aliyah* eligible – whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above.²⁶ It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the Law of Return population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.




As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the Law of Return applies to a large population – the so-called *aliyah* eligible – whose scope is significantly wider than the core and enlarged Jewish populations

Distant ancestries

These definitions do not include currently non-Jewish people who may claim more distant Jewish ancestry, such as descendants of *conversos* since the time of the Spanish Inquisition, or the so called 'Lost Tribes'.²⁷

Figure 8 summarises the main Jewish population definitions outlined here. These are visualised as concentric circles with the Core Jewish population at the centre, surrounded by more extended population circles with declining degrees of attachment to Jewish identification. The affiliated Jewish community can be imagined as persons situated in the core of the core.

Figure 8. Main definition criteria for contemporary Jewish populations



²⁶ Corinaldi, 1998 and 2018, cit.

²⁷ See e.g. Parfitt, T. 2002. *The lost tribes of Israel: The history of a myth*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson; Parfitt, T., and N. Fisher, eds. 2016. *Becoming Jewish: New Jews and Emerging Jewish Communities in a Globalized World*. Newcastle-upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing; DellaPergola, S. 2019. Latino Jewish Demography: The Real and the Virtual, in A. Gross, A. Moryosef, J. Cohen (eds.) *Iberian New Christians and Their Descendants*. Newcastle-upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 18–34.

Sources of data

Jewish population data come from a large array of different sources, each with inherent advantages and disadvantages. It is important to be aware of the great effort invested to bring these different sources to a common denominator, so that they are compatible and comparable in the first place. In Appendix A Table A1 we report both the main type and the evaluated accuracy of the sources used in this study. Each main type of source in the following short description and in Appendix Table A1 is indicated with a different distinctive initial:

- (C)** National population census. This, in theory, would be the best source, if available, but undercounts and overcounts do occur in several countries which need to be evaluated. Censuses in many countries do not provide numbers about the population classified by religion or ethnic origin. Often the figures about Jews should be considered underestimates because part of the Jewish population may prefer not to publicly declare their group identification.
- (P)** National population register. Some countries, as a substitute for or alongside the periodical census, keep a permanent register of the population by religious groups, which is constantly updated through detailed counting of individual demographic events, such as births, deaths, migration, or changes of religious identification.
- (S)** Survey of the total population including details on Jews, or survey of the Jewish population, national or inclusive of the main localities. Jewish population surveys are undertaken most often by a Jewish community organisation, and sometimes by a public organisation. The quality of such surveys may range widely according to the methodology followed in defining the Jewish population, the techniques of more or less representative sample selection and response rates.
- (J)** Jewish community register kept by central or by local Jewish community organisations. These registers undercount the actual Jewish population because they do not include non-members.
- (E)** Estimate otherwise obtained by a Jewish organisation or other Jewish observers. The consistent tendency of such estimates not corroborated by real empirical evidence has been to inflate the reported number of Jews.

Our estimates reflect a composite of these different sources, but the figures reported below do not necessarily correspond exactly with those indicated in each original source. When necessary, additional information is brought to bear in deriving our estimates.

The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each country's Jewish population estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the baseline data; (b) how recent the base data are; and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in Appendix Table A1, as follows:

- (A)** Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population change in the respective country during the intervening period.

- (B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population change during the intervening period.
- (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.
- (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

The year in which a country's base estimate or important partial updates were initially obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the initial basis for its attainment.

Significant gaps exist when more than one source is available. This reflects the fact, or at least the assumption that a certain fringe of the Jewish population prefers not to declare itself as such in official censuses or in other databases. On the other hand, even where Jewish community membership registers exist, a certain fringe of the Jewish population is known or assumed not to be included. Population surveys, too, reach samples whose coverage efficiency is nearly impossible to ascertain. All these supposed Jewish unknowns need to be reintegrated in the overall total estimates. In one case, Hungary, the gap between census and other estimates was particularly wide (10,965 in the 2011 national census, as against 13,000 in 2001, versus 60–110,000 as estimated in a Jewish survey).²⁸ More often than not, however, such multiple sources are not available.

In 2018, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) survey on Jewish people's perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in thirteen EU countries²⁹ provided a new set of data on demographic, socioeconomic and Jewish identity characteristics of Jewish population. The survey was conducted online on a total sample of over 16,000 respondents. In spite of some possible biases due to the self-selection of the respondents, the results, when compared to similar data from other sources, provided a satisfactory sense of consistency. In fact, the survey constitutes a hybrid case between a randomly selected sample of the total Jewish population, and a survey of those affiliated with Jewish organisations, plus those among the unaffiliated encircling the organised Jewish community at close orbit.³⁰ Such data do not accurately describe a population's compositional characteristics but they are adequate for describing relationships between different demographic and social variables. The 2018 FRA survey data are used extensively in this report and are outlined in greater detail in Appendix D.

28 Kovács, A., and I. Barna. 2018. *Zsidók és zsidóság Magyarországon 2017. Ben egy szociológiai kutatás eredményei*. Budapest: Szombat; DellaPergola, 2020, in *American Jewish Year Book*, cit.

29 FRA, 2018a, cit. See also FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2018b. *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism – Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU. Questionnaire*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. A previous survey was conducted along similar lines in 2012, see: FRA – European Union Fundamental Rights Agency. 2013. *Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*. Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

30 Staetsky, L.D. 2019a. Can convenience samples be trusted? Lessons from the survey of Jews in Europe, 2012. *Contemporary Jewry*, 39, 1, 117–153.

Evidently, undifferentiated use of these various estimates is bound to generate disagreements about the actual sizes of the Jewish population. Experience teaches that – inasmuch as the data were collected seriously and impartially, if they exist at all – disagreements can be solved by making reference to one unified definitional system as outlined above.³¹ The following chapter demonstrates a systematic effort to bring Jewish population data that may be perceived locally as different or even incompatible to an empirical common denominator.


31 Such coordinating effort has been undertaken at the global level since 1960 by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. For a general overview of European population by religious groups see: Stonawski, M., V. Skirbekk, C. Hackett, M. Potancoková, and B. Grim. 2014. The Size and Demographic Structure of Religions in Europe, in B.J. Grim, T.M. Johnson, V. Skirbekk, and G.A. Zurlo (eds.) *Yearbook of International Religious Demography 2014*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 131–142; see also Pew Reserch Center. 2015. Religious Composition by Country, 2010–2050. www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/. The Joshua project run by Frontier Ventures – a protestant religious order – operates an independent attempt to estimate all religious and ethnic groups country by country, see: <https://joshuaproject.net/global/countries>

4 / How many Jews are there in Europe?

This chapter presents the rationale and background for the most recent Jewish population estimates in fifty countries and territories in Europe. The following chapters will elaborate more on the internal mechanisms of Jewish population change, and on the contextual/ environmental variables also likely to affect the outcome.

Figure 9 shows Jewish population estimates for the whole of Europe and for its three main geographical divisions, showing in each case different Jewish population definitions. Each pie displays the core Jewish population size in the darker colour, and the respective *population increments* (deltas = Δ) due to gradually expanding definition criteria. In other words,

Figure 9. Schematic representation of Jewish population size, by main definitional criteria and principal geographical divisions, 2020



Deltas = Δ represent the respective population increments due to gradually expanding definition criteria.

starting with the core Jewish population in the darker colour, each successive sector in clockwise direction shows *the additional number of people added* when progressively moving to more inclusive definitional criteria. More distant attributions of Jewish ancestry are not addressed in the data reported here. The different configurations of the three main geographical divisions are quite striking. At the one extreme, the FSU displays a relatively low share of CJP versus much larger proportionate shares of other types – PJP, EJP, and LRP. This is due to the high rates of assimilation and intermarriage that have prevailed in large parts of the Soviet Union since the interwar period during the first half of the twentieth century. At the opposite end there is a group of ‘Other’ countries, dominated numerically by the UK, which is located quite low on the global spectrum of Jewish assimilation. Among these, the core Jewish population constitutes a clear majority of the total pie inclusive of more extended definitions. In between these stands the EU 27 group (without the UK), where the core Jewish population constitutes slightly more than half of the total covered by the broader Law of Return definition.

In actual numbers, using CJP as our guide, we estimate that on 1 January 2020, 1,329,400 Jews lived in Europe. Of these, 788,800 lived in one of the 27 EU countries – not including the UK; 210,400 lived in one of the four European republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) – not including the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania already included in the EU; and 330,200 lived in one of 19 other countries and territories on the continent. Jews in the UK constituted close to 90% of the Jewish population in the latter division.

The total European Population with Jewish parents (PJP) comprised an additional 489,900 people, bringing a total of 1,819,300. The Enlarged Jewish population (EJP) comprised an additional 505,800 people, reaching a total of 2,325,300. The Law of Return population (LRP) comprised

an additional 495,700 people, creating a total of 2,820,800. It is thus estimated that the total difference between the Law of Return and Core Jewish population definitions amounted to 1,488,300 individuals. In other words, the Law of Return covered a population estimated to be more than double (2.12 times) the number of core Jews. Because of the different underlying demographic and social trends, the Law of Return/Core Jewish population ratio was significantly different in the three areas of Europe: about twice in the EU 27; over four times in the FSU European republics; and 1.4 times in the rest of Europe. The major explanation for this variation is the different incidence of intermarriage during the last three generations, and possibly also somewhat different patterns in choosing the religious identity of the children of intermarriages in the different parts of Europe.

The Core Jewish population distribution by major areas was 59% in the EU 27; 16% in the FSU European republics (excluding the Baltics); and 25% in other European countries, of whom 22% are in the UK. On the other hand, the Law of Return population distribution was quite different: 53%, 30%, and 17%, respectively.

Another important aspect to consider is the share of Jews among the total population. The 1,329,400 core Jews constituted 1.60 per 1000 of Europe’s total population, or one in 626 inhabitants. In the EU the share of Jews per 1000 population was 1.77, or one in 565, versus 1.04 in the FSU European republics or one in 962, and 1.81 in other European countries, or one in 552.

In the following section, the main sources and rationale for determining each country’s *Core Jewish population* estimate are briefly presented for every country with a Jewish population of at least 100. It should be noted that the estimates rely on prolonged research work that has monitored Jewish population changes year-by-year since 1982, and detailed explanations can

be found by reviewing that literature.³² The estimates reported here reflect the latest data available locally for each country, critically evaluated in the light of other direct or indirect sources of information. In almost all cases the estimates presented results from cross-checking different sources of data, as well as evaluations provided by Jewish community organisations.



At the beginning of 2020 the total Core Jewish population of the EU 27 was estimated at 788,800 following the departure of the UK

Countries are listed by decreasing Jewish population size within each major geographical division in the European continent. Detailed country estimates by different Jewish population definitions are presented in Appendix A, Table A1. It should be noted that each single Jewish population estimate basically constitutes the central value of a range and is subject to changes in the light of better information that might become available in the future. Future publications in this series will devote careful attention to each country or group of countries separately, will specify in greater detail the sources of data and ongoing population dynamics and structure, and, if necessary, will improve and update the resulting estimates.³³

The European Union 27

At the beginning of 2020 the total Core Jewish population of the EU 27 was estimated at 788,800 following the departure of the UK. The population

with Jewish parents was estimated at 1,010,500, the Enlarged Jewish population at 1,267,800, and the Law of Return population at 1,505,700.

France³⁴

In the absence of census and other official statistical data of religious groups, Jewish population estimates in France rely primarily on several independent surveys conducted since the 1970s. A pioneer survey in 1975 estimated the total at 530,000 core Jews; a 2002 national survey suggested a figure of 500,000, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households. Several follow-ups indicated a decreasing Jewish population, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel (over 51,000 between 2000 and 2019), but also to Canada, the US and other countries. In 2015 a survey based on an enlarged Jewish population definition did not reach firm conclusions about the core Jewish population size but provided insights about their past and prospective migration. 39% reported relatives in Israel, while 31% had relatives in the US, Canada, the UK and elsewhere. This would correspond to a migrant ratio of 56% to Israel versus 44% to other countries. Regarding possible future migration, 13% reported that they were seriously considering moving to Israel and another 30% had thought about it. The corresponding percentages for migrating to other countries were 13% and 33%, respectively. Assuming Israel attracted half to two-thirds of the total who left France, between 75,000 and 100,000 Jews and family members are estimated to have left France since 2000. Some of these returned to France in the meantime. More than half of Jews live in the Greater Paris metropolitan region. Considering these trends, our 2019 core estimate for French Jewry is 448,000.

32 The relevant estimates were published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book*. The series began with Schmelz, U.O. 1981. Jewish survival: The demographic factors. *American Jewish Year Book* 81: 61–117. New York: American Jewish Committee. The most recently issued is DellaPergola, 2020, cit.

33 See the example in our report on Austria, Staetsky and DellaPergola, 2019b, cit.

34 Bensimon and DellaPergola, 1984, cit.; Cohen, E.H., and M. Ifergan. 2003. *Les Juifs de France: Valeurs et identité*. Paris: Fonds Social Juif Unifié; Cohen, E.H. 2005. *Les touristes de France en Israël 2004*. Jerusalem: unpublished paper; Cohen, E.H. 2007. *Heureux comme Juifs en France? Étude sociologique*. Jerusalem: Elkana et Akadem; Cohen, E.H. 2011. *The Jews of France Today. Identity and Values*. Leiden-Boston: Brill; Ifop pour la Fondation Jean Jaurès. 2015. *Enquête auprès des Juifs de France*. Paris: IFOP.

Germany³⁵

The central Jewish community holds a Jewish population register updated in the light of the various determinants of yearly change. There were some 32,000 Jews in Germany in 1989. Between the early 1990s and 2005, Jewish immigration, mainly from the FSU, brought large numbers of Jewish and non-Jewish household members to the country. The total number of core Jews registered with the central Jewish community increased to a peak of 107,794 in 2007, diminishing gradually to 96,325 in 2019. Following cuts in German government incentives, Jewish immigration from the FSU was subsequently reduced to a few hundred annually. German Jews are very elderly; for example, in 2018 only 227 Jewish births were recorded versus 1,572 Jewish deaths – a loss of 1,345. A degree of underreporting of births is suspected in the communal population register, which makes the German Jewish population appear older and less capable of reproducing itself naturally than it is in reality. The underreporting, however, is not on a scale that can invalidate the picture fundamentally. Reflecting the national policy of geographical dispersion of immigrants, the Jewish presence spanned the industrial areas of North-Rein-Westphalia, Bavaria, Hesse and Berlin. The community-registered Jewish

population in Berlin diminished from 10,009 at the beginning of 2007 to 9,255 in 2019, but Jews living in Berlin might actually be increasing, as several among them are still registered elsewhere in Germany. Between 2000 and 2015, 33,321 Israelis were granted German passports. 31,722 of them kept their Israeli citizenship and 1,599 renounced it. However, most did not choose to settle in Germany, as of the end of November 2016, there were just 13,289 Israeli citizens living in Germany. At the end of 2018, the number of officially recorded Israelis in Berlin was 5,319, versus 3,065 in 2011. Allowing for delays in joining the organised community on the part of new immigrants and the choice by some Jews not to affiliate, we estimated Germany's core Jewish population at 118,000, part of a larger Law of Return population estimated at 275,000.

Hungary³⁶

The population trends of the Hungarian Jewish community reflect the unavoidably negative balance of births and deaths in an ageing country whose total population has been diminishing for years. In the 2011 Hungarian Census, only 10,965 reported themselves as Jewish by religion, compared to 13,000 in 2001, clearly an underestimate but indicative of a trend. Two surveys of the Jewish population, conducted

- 35 Schoeps, J.H., W. Jasper, and B. Vogt, eds. 1999. *Ein neues Judentum in Deutschland? Fremd und Eigenbilder der russisch-jüdischen Einwanderer*. Potsdam: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg; Dietz, B., U. Lebok, and P. Polian. 2002. The Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union to Germany. *International Migration* 40(2): 29–48; Cohen, Y., and I. Kogan. 2005. Jewish immigration from the Former Soviet Union to Germany and Israel in the 1990s. *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book* 50: 249–265; Erlanger, S. 2006. Changes in the German Jewish Community, in Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, *Annual assessment 2006, Major Shifts – Threats and Opportunities*, Executive report 3. Jerusalem: JPPPI, 83–88; Ben Rafael, E., O. Gloeckner, O., and Y. Sternberg. 2011. *Jews and Jewish education in Germany today*. Leiden-Boston: Brill; Glöckner, O. 2013. Germany, in Staetsky, L., J. Boyd, E. Ben-Rafael, E. Cohen, S. DellaPergola, L. Dencik, O. Glöckner, and A. Kovács. *Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in selected EU member states*, 98–100. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research and Ipsos MORI; Harpaz, Y. 2013. Rooted Cosmopolitans: Israelis with a European Passport – History, Property, Identity. *International Migration Review*, 47(1): 166–206; Rebhun, U., H. Sünker, D. Kranz, N. Beider, K. Harbi, M. Shorer-Kaplan. 2016. *Israelis in Contemporary Germany: Social Integration and the Construction of Group Identity*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Wuppertal: Bergische Universität, SWP-German Institute for International and Security Affairs; The Times of Israel. 2017. Over 33,000 Israelis have taken German Citizenship since 2000. 12 February. www.timesofisrael.com/over-33000-israelis-have-taken-german-citizenship-since-2000/; Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland. 2019. *Mitgliederstatistik der Jüdischen Gemeinde und Landesverbände in Deutschland für das Jahr 2019*. Frankfurt a.M: ZWJD; Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg. 2012. *Statistisches Jahrbuch Berlin 2012*. Berlin: Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg; Statistik Berlin Brandenburg. 2019. *Statistisches Jahrbuch 2019*. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag.
- 36 Stark, T. 1995. *A magyar zsidóság statisztikája: Kutatási jelentés*. Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézete; Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa. 2002. *Final report*. Bern: Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa; Kovács, A., ed. 2004. *Jews and Jewry in contemporary Hungary: Results of a sociological survey*, JPR report No. 1. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 2003. *Population Census 2001*. Budapest: KSH; Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 2013. *Population Census 2011*. Budapest: KSH; Kovács, A. 2013a. Hungary, in Staetsky, L., J. Boyd, E. Ben-Rafael, E. Cohen, S. DellaPergola, L. Dencik, O. Glöckner, and A. Kovács. *Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in selected EU member states*, 101–102. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research/Ipsos MORI (unpublished); Kovács and Barna, 2018, cit.

in 1999 and 2017, suggested a larger Jewish population, but the definitions used included people of Jewish background. A minimum-maximum range of 58,936–110,679 by such an *enlarged* definition confirmed the substantial gaps in the Jewish population size according to different definitions. Our *core* estimate considered the detailed development of Jewish emigration from Hungary to Israel since the end of the Second World War and to other countries, and the presumed number of Shoah survivors. The suggested number of 47,200 core Jews was closer to the bottom of the range, while the Law of Return population was estimated at 130,000.

The Netherlands³⁷

Jews in the Netherlands were studied in two demographic surveys in 1954 and in 1966. Two more recent Jewish surveys in 1999 and in 2009 found high levels of intermarriage, a growing percentage of elderly, and an increase in the number of Israelis. Out of an *enlarged* Jewish population of 53,000, 25% had a Jewish mother and 30% had a Jewish father. Accounting for ageing and assuming that incoming migration tended to balance emigration, our core Jewish population estimate is 29,800.

Belgium³⁸

This Jewish population is among the least documented in Europe. In the absence of a census or central Jewish community register, directories of Jewish organisations or commercial activities aimed at the Jewish public provide a useful, though rough, proxy. Relatively stable numbers have reflected a higher rate of natural increase among the traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative centre in Brussels that can attract Jews from other countries. Our original data processing from the 2018 FRA survey indicates a synagogue affiliation rate of 98% in Antwerp versus 75% in Brussels and 70% in other minor communities. Allowing for multiple synagogue membership, in Antwerp 73% were members of a strictly orthodox synagogue, versus 2% in Brussels and 1% in other places. Significant emigration since 2000 reflected growing concerns about Islamist terrorism and antisemitism. The Jewish population is estimated at 29,000.

Italy³⁹

In 2012, a new survey of the Jewish population updated the Jewish population profile for the first time since the previous survey in 1965.

- 37 Committee for the Demography of the Jews in the Netherlands. 1961–1962. Dutch Jewry: A Demographic Analysis, *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 3, 2, 195–242, and 4, 1, 47–71; van Praag, Ph. 1976. *Demography of the Jews in the Netherlands*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Jewish Population Studies, 8, 91 pp.; van Solinge, H., and M. de Vries, eds. 2001. *De Joden in Nederland Anno 2000: Demografisch profiel en binding aan het joodendom*. Amsterdam: Aksant; Kooyman, C., and J. Almagor. 1996. *Israelis in Holland: A sociodemographic study of Israelis and former Israelis in Holland*. Amsterdam: Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk; van Solinge, H., and C. van Praag. 2010. *De Joden in Nederland anno 2009 continueit en verandering*. Diemen: AMB; Tanenbaum, B., and R. Kooyman. 2014. *Jewish feelings, Jewish practice? Children of Jewish intermarriage in the Netherlands*. Paris-Oxford: JDC International Centre for Community Development.
- 38 Cohn, S. 2003. *Résultats élections législatives*. Brussels, unpublished manuscript; Ben Rafael, E. 2013. Belgium, in Staetsky, L., J. Boyd, E. Ben-Rafael, E. Cohen, S. DellaPergola, L. Dencik, O. Glöckner, and A. Kovács. *Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in selected EU member states*, 93–94. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Ipsos MORI; Ben Rafael, E. 2014. *Confronting Allo-Semitism in Europe. The Case of Belgian Jews*. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- 39 DellaPergola, 1975, cit.; DellaPergola, S. 1976. *Anatomia dell'ebraismo italiano: caratteristiche demografiche, economiche, sociali, religiose e politiche di una minoranza*. Roma-Assisi: Carucci; DellaPergola, S. 1997. La popolazione ebraica in Italia nel contesto ebraico globale, in: C. Vivanti (ed.) *Storia d'Italia. Gli ebrei in Italia, Annali*, 11, 2, 895–936. Torino: Einaudi; Lattes, Y.A. 2005. *Sull'assimilazione in Italia e i metodi per affrontarla*. Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University; DellaPergola, S. 2015. Antisemitism in Italy. *International Journal of Global Diaspora Studies*, 1, 1, 41–61; DellaPergola, S., and L.D. Staetsky. 2015. *From Old and New Directions: Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism among Jews in Italy*. London: Jewish Policy Research Institute JPR; Campelli, E. 2013. *Comunità va cercando, ch'è sì cara.... Sociologia dell'Italia ebraica*. Milano: Franco Angeli; Campelli, E. 2016. Le comunità ebraiche italiane: dati, processi, atteggiamenti, in U.G. Pacifici and G. Pacifici (eds.) *Sociologia degli ebrei italiani oggi*. Milano: Jaca Books, 17–32; Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane. 2002. *IV Congresso, Relazione del consiglio*. Roma: UCEI; Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane. 2010. *Indagine demografica – Numero degli iscritti delle comunità*. Roma: UCEI; Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane. 2018. *Riepilogo Censimento Comunità al 31 dicembre 2017*. Roma: UCEI.

A central Jewish membership register allowed for updated numbers. The total Jewish community membership historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population. The total national membership decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 23,361 in 2018. Our estimate of 27,300 allows for the unaffiliated and some increase in conversions to Judaism, also taking into account recently increased emigration.

Spain⁴⁰

In the absence of central sources, the updated Jewish population estimate must rely on the initial basis of affiliated households and allows for some continuing immigration from Latin America as well as continuing emigration. According to Comunidad Judía de Madrid CJM and the Bet El membership records there were about 1,200 affiliated families in Madrid in 2019. Keeping with the estimated average household size of three obtained through a survey (the 2018 FRA survey, see below), the 3,600 in affiliated households may correspond to a total Jewish population of around 6,000, assuming an affiliation rate of about 60%. In Barcelona the approximately 2,700 Jews in 800–900 households affiliated with Comunidad Israelita de Barcelona CIP and other communities, would roughly correspond to about 5,000 with a slightly lower affiliation. According to the FRA survey, 85% of respondents lived in the two major cities, which leads to a national estimate of 13,000. The Spanish government's 2015 initiative to offer Spanish citizenship to Jews

able to demonstrate ancestry from the medieval expulsion resulted in over 132,000 applications, mostly from Latin American countries, as well as 5,400 from the US and 4,900 from Israel. The actual number of naturalisations was much lower given the stringent criteria required, such as knowledge of Spanish, the Spanish Constitution and Iberian culture. Most Latin American applicants were not themselves part of the core Jewish population or Law of Return definition but applied based on more distant ancestry criteria. Nevertheless, citizenship may be an incentive for some people to move to Spain.

Other countries in Western Europe

In **Austria**⁴¹ the last census was in 2001; it registered the presence of 8,140 Jews. Current Jewish community records and state vital statistics supported an upward revision to a new estimate of 10,300 in 2020.⁴² In **Ireland**⁴³ according to the 2016 census, there were 2,557 Jews, a 28.9% increase from 2011. Our estimate was 2,700. In **Portugal**⁴⁴ the 2011 census found 3,061 Jews, of whom 1,149 were in Lisbon. In 1994 several crypto-Jews converted to Judaism in the rural community of Belmonte. A law approved in 2015 sought to atone for the late medieval expulsions from that part of the Iberian Peninsula, and may have attracted a small number of Jews to apply for, and gain Portuguese residency and citizenship. Friendly income tax provisions for retired EU citizens might encourage further applications for Portuguese

40 Cytto, O. 2007. *Jewish identification in contemporary Spain – A European case study*. Jerusalem: European Forum at The Hebrew University, Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies in collaboration with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung; Puntarello, P. 2019. Personal communication. Madrid: Comunidad Judía de Madrid; Jones, S. 2019. 132,000 descendants of expelled Jews apply for Spanish citizenship. *The Guardian*. Manchester, October 2. www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/02/132000-sephardic-jews-apply-for-spanish-citizenship

41 Statistik Austria. 2003. *Volkszählung 2001: Wohnbevölkerung nach Religion und Staatsangehörigkeit für Bundesländer*. Wien: Statistik Austria; Statistik Austria. 2019. Vital statistics. Personal communication to L.D. Staetsky, JPR; Staetsky and DellaPergola, 2020, cit.

42 For a detailed assessment of the demography of Jews in Austria, see: Staetsky, L.D. and DellaPergola, S. (2020). *Jews in Austria: a demographic and social portrait*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

43 Ireland Central Statistics Office. 2012. *Census of Population 2011*. Dublin: Ireland Central Statistics Office; Ireland Central Statistics Office, 2017. *Census of Population 2016*. Dublin: Ireland Central Statistics Office.

44 Statistics Portugal. 2002. *Censos 2001. Resultados definitivos: Portugal*. Lisboa: Instituto Nacional de Estatística; Statistics Portugal; Statistics Portugal. 2012. *Censos 2011. Resultados definitivos: Portugal. População*. Lisboa: Statistics Portugal; Comunidade Israelita de Lisboa, community records; Nolan, R. 2008. After 500 Years in Hiding, Jews Bring Prosperity to Iberian Town. *Forward*, January 2; BBC. 2015. Portugal to naturalise descendants of Jews expelled centuries ago. London: January 29. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31051223

residency and citizenship. The permanent Jewish population there was estimated at 3,100 in 2020, versus 1,773 in 2001. In **Luxembourg**,⁴⁵ a country with increasing percentages of citizens declaring no religion, the presence of EU organisations could be an incentive to some Jewish immigration. Our estimated core Jewish population was 700 out of a Law of Return population of about 1,300.

Nordic countries

In the 1960s, **Sweden**⁴⁶ absorbed substantial Jewish immigration from Poland. The total affiliated community today is estimated at about 5,600. Based on a local survey and indications of the proportion affiliated among total FRA respondents, the Jewish population was estimated to be quite stable at 15,000. In **Denmark**⁴⁷ Jewish community records counted 1,885 Jews in Copenhagen above 18 in 2014, of whom 53% were aged 61 and more. This total compared with 2,037 in 2009 and 2,205 in 2004. Such a shrinking trend was compensated by some immigration. Our estimate, also inclusive of children below 18, is 6,400 for 2020. In **Finland**⁴⁸ the national population register recorded 1,157 Jews at the end of 2000, and 1,132 in 2015. Our core estimate for 2020 is 1,300.

Other countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans

In **Romania**⁴⁹ the 2002 census data indicated 6,179 Jews by religion. In 2011 the number by religion had diminished to 3,519. 2,371 of these also reported a Jewish ethnicity, and 1,148 reported another ethnicity. In addition, there were another 900 with a Jewish ethnicity and another religion. Thus, the enlarged Jewish population by religion and/or ethnicity was 4,419. Jewish community records provided higher figures but also a profile of extreme ageing following many years of intensive emigration, especially to Israel. Our estimate of 8,900 considered earlier higher Jewish community estimates, intervening emigration, and the unavoidable decline due to Jewish population ageing. In **Bulgaria**⁵⁰ the 2011 census found 706 Jews. We estimated the total at 2,000. In **Poland**⁵¹ the 2011 population census found 7,434 persons declaring a Jewish ethnicity, of whom about 2,000 indicated Jewish as their only ethnicity and about a further 5,000 indicated Jewish as their second ethnicity besides Polish. Jewish community membership was reported at 1,222. We adopted an estimate of 4,500, assuming that half of those reporting multiple ethnicities would fall within the *core* Jewish population definition (not having another religion) and half would pertain to more extended

45 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Statec. 2011. *Population census 2011*. Vaduz: Statec; European Commission. 2019. *Eurobarometer 90.4: Attitudes of Europeans towards Biodiversity, Awareness and Perceptions of EU customs, and Perceptions of Antisemitism*. Retrieved 15 July 2019 – via GESIS, Mannheim: Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences.

46 Dencik, L. 2003. 'Jewishness' in postmodernity: *The case of Sweden, Paideia report*. Stockholm: The European Institute for Jewish Studies; Dencik, L. 2006. "Homo Zappiens": A European-Jewish way of life in the era of globalization, in S. Lustig and I. Leveson (eds.) *Turning the Kaleidoscope: Perspectives on European Jewry*. New York-Oxford: Berghahn Books, 79–102; Dencik, L. 2013. Sweden, in Staetsky, L., J. Boyd, E. Ben-Rafael, E. Cohen, S. DellaPergola, L. Dencik, O. Glöckner, and A. Kovács. *Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in selected EU member states*, 112–120. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Ipsos MORI; Dencik, L., and K. Marosi. 2017. *Different Antisemitisms. Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in Sweden and across Europe*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

47 Det Mosaiske Troosamfund i Kobenhaven. 2014. Denmark Medlemstal ultimo 2004 og 2009 og 2014 (unpublished data). Copenhagen: Det Mosaiske Troosamfund.

48 Statistics Finland. 2016. *Population Structure 2015, Population by religious community in 2000 to 2015*. Helsinki: Statistics Finland.

49 Institutu National de Statistica. 2013. *Recensamantul populatiei si al locuintelor*. Populatia stabile dupa etnie si religie – categorii de localitati. Bucarest: INS.

50 Republic of Bulgaria, National Statistical Institute. 2012. *Census 2011 final results*. Population by place of residence, age and religion. Sofia: NSI.

51 Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2012. *Raport z wyników. Narodowy Spis ludności i mieszkań 2011*. Warsaw: GUS.

definitions. In the **Czech Republic**⁵² the figure from the 2011 census was 345 by religion and 521 by ethnicity. However, we considered this source to be unreliable as a large part of the population boycotted the nationality question in 2011. The Jewish community estimate was 3,000. Our estimate was 3,900 for 2020. In **Slovakia**⁵³ the 2011 census found 1,911 Jews by religion and 631 by ethnicity, an undercount, though less than in the previous census of 2001 when 218 were declared by ethnicity. We estimated the total at 2,600. In **Croatia**⁵⁴ the 2011 census identified 509 Jews by ethnicity, compared to 576 in 2001. Based on the estimates from earlier censuses and local community surveys (above 2,000 Jews), these are certainly undercounts. Our updated estimate was 1,700. In **Slovenia**⁵⁵ the 2002 census reported 28 Jews by ethnicity and 99 by religion, with a claimed membership of 130. Our 2020 estimate stands at 100 permanent residents. In **Greece**⁵⁶ in the absence of a census, existing Jewish community records suggested an estimated Jewish population of 4,100, with about 3,000 in Athens and 1,000 in Salonika.

Baltic countries

After joining the European Union, the situation in the former Soviet republics in the Baltic states changed significantly. In **Latvia**⁵⁷ the 2011 census reported 6,454 Jews. The population register reported 4,721 for 2018. Our estimate for the year 2020 allowing for emigration and natural decrease was 4,500. In **Lithuania**⁵⁸ the 2011 census reported 3,050 Jews. The population register indicated a decline from 2,267 in 2015 to 2,087 in 2019. The number born in Israel increased from 18 in 2015 to 140 in 2019 – very small but indicative of a broader regional pattern. Our 2020 estimate was 2,400 allowing for emigration and immigration. In **Estonia**⁵⁹ the 2011 census reported 2,000 Jews. Our updated estimate allowing for emigration was 1,900. The total for the three former Soviet republics thus amounted to 8,800 Jews in 2020.

Other countries

In **Cyprus**⁶⁰ we estimated a Jewish population of 300, based mostly on the number of Israel-born residents reported in the census. In **Malta**⁶¹ in the absence of real data and based on community reports, we estimated the number of Jews at 100.

- 52 Czech Statistical Office. 2014. *Národnostní struktura obyvatel*. Prague: CZSO; Tarant, Z. 2016. *Yitzhak and Isma'el: Jews and Muslims in the Czech Republic – demography, attitudes of majority, mutual relations*. Pilzen: University of West Bohemia, Department of Middle-Eastern Studies. See also: Vobecká, J. 2013. *Demographic Avant-Garde: Jews in Bohemia between Enlightenment and Shoah*. Budapest-New York: Central European University Press.
- 53 Peric. M. 1977. Demographic study of the Jewish community in Yugoslavia, 1971–1972, in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola (eds.) *Papers in Jewish Demography 1973*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Jewish Population Studies; Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 2015. *The 2011 Population and Housing Census Facts about changes in the life of the Slovak population*. Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic; Obyvatel'stvo SR podľa národnosti – sčítanie 2011, 2001. Bratislava: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
- 54 Svob, M. 2004. *Jews in Croatia. Jewish Communities*. Zagreb: Izvori; Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2016. Population by ethnicity, 1971–2011 censuses. Zagreb: DZS; Vlada Republike Hrvatske, Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2015. Nacionalne manjine u Republici Hrvatskoj. <https://pravamanjina.gov.hr/nacionalne-manjine/nacionalne-manjine-u-republici-hrvatskoj/352>. Zagreb: DZS.
- 55 Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. *Population by ethnic affiliation, 1961–2002 censuses*. Ljubljana: SURS; Z24.si. 2011. *Judje zaključujejo praznovanje hanuke*. December 27.
- 56 Kentriko Israelitiko Simvoulío Ellados – KIS. 2018. Personal communication; Rabinowitz, G. 2015. Amid their country's financial crisis, Greek Jews struggle and brace for more turmoil. July 6. Jta.org.
- 57 Central Statistics Office of Latvia. 2011. *Population census of 2011*. Riga: *Central Statistics Office of Latvia*. www.csb.gov.lv/en; Kovács, A. 2013b. Latvia, in Staetsky, L., J. Boyd, E. Ben-Rafael, E. Cohen, S. DellaPergola, L. Dencik, O. Glöckner, and A. Kovács. *Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in selected EU member states*, 109–110. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Ipsos MORI.
- 58 Lietuvos Statistikos Departamentas. 2011. *Rodiklių duomenų bazėje*. Kaunas:LS. www.stat.gov.lt/en/; Goldstein, S., and A. Goldstein. 1997. *Lithuanian Jewry 1993: A demographic and sociocultural profile*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry.
- 59 Statistics Estonia. 2020. Population by ethnic nationality, 1 January. Tallinn: ES. www.stat.ee/en
- 60 European Commission, Eurostat, *2011 Population and Housing Census Database of Europe*. Brussels: Eurostat.
- 61 Tayar, A.P. 2020. The Jews of Malta. Tel Aviv: Bet Hatefutot. www.bh.org.il/jews-malta/

The former Soviet Union⁶²

The Soviet Union had a long series of population censuses as well as detailed vital statistics in which the Jewish population was defined as an ethnic national group. After the dissolution of the USSR each republic started to run a separate statistical system. As a consequence, fewer data were available and it was harder to make comparisons. Many doubts have been expressed regarding the reliability of the numbers reported in such official sources, with specific suspicions of serious underestimates. However, research that has linked the various results between the censuses of 1959 and 2010, taking into account the reported numbers of births, deaths, marriages and international migrants, found very high levels of consistency between one census and the next. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the underlying trend is coherently represented by the available data, even if the numbers are not fully reliable down to the last digit. The total Core Jewish population of the FSU republics in Europe was estimated at 210,400, not including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (already included in the EU). The population with Jewish parents was 430,800,

the Enlarged Jewish population 632,500, and the Law of Return population 843,000. By adding the three Baltic republics together, the core Jewish population would increase by 8,800, the population with Jewish parents by 15,400, the enlarged Jewish population by 23,000, and the Law of Return population by 36,000.

Russia⁶³

The 1994 Microcensus estimated that there were 409,000 Jews living in Russia at that time. The 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews. After the compulsory item on ethnicity (*natsyonalnost*) on identification documents was cancelled and the census ethnicity question became optional, the 2010 Russian Census provided a core Jewish population estimate of 157,763, plus another 41,000 undeclared people proportionally allocated to the core Jewish population, resulting in an estimated total of 200,600 in 2010. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and this basic configuration was not much altered through emigration or vital events. Since then, the Jewish population has diminished rapidly as a result of a striking negative balance of Jewish births and deaths,

62 Most of the items quoted in the following section on Russia also deal with some or all the other republics of the former Soviet Union.

63 Altshuler, M. 1987. *Soviet Jewry since the Second World War: Population and social structure*. New York: Greenwood; Goskomstat. 1989. Всесоюзная перепись населения 1989 (1989 All-Union Census). Moscow: Goskomstat; Goskomstat. 1994. *Mikroperepis' naselenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1994*. Moscow: Goskomstat (author's own processing); Tolts, M. 2003. Demography of the Jews in the Former Soviet Union: Yesterday and Today, in Z. Gitelman with M. Glants and M.I. Goldman (eds.) *Jewish Life After the USSR*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 173–206; Tolts, M. 2004. The Post-Soviet Jewish Population in Russia and the World. *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe*, 52 (1), 37–63; Kupovetsky, M. 2005. K otsenke chislennosti evreev i demograficheskogo potentsiala evreiskoi obshchiny v SSSR i postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh v 1989–2003 gg. [An estimate of the number of Jews and demographic potential of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet states for 1989–2003], in M. Chlenov, ed., *Evroaziatskii evreiskii ezhegodnik 5765* (Euro-Asian Jewish year book 5765). Kiev: Dukh i Litera, 78–91; Tolts, M. 2006. Contemporary trends in family formation among the Jews in Russia. *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe* 57: 5–23; Tolts, M. 2007. Post-Soviet Jewish demography, 1989–2004, in *Revolution, repression, and revival: The Soviet Jewish experience*, ed. Z. Gitelman and Y. Ro'i, 283–311. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield; Tolts, M. 2008. Migration since World War I, in G.D. Hundert (ed.) *The YIVO encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1434–1440; Tolts, M. 2009. *Some demographic and socio-economic trends of the Jews in Russia and the FSU*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics; Cohen, Y. 2009. Migration to and from Israel. *Contemporary Jewry* 29(2): 115–125; Tolts, M. 2014. Sources for the demographic study of the Jews in the former Soviet Union. *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 27: 160–177; Tolts, M. 2015. Demographic Transformations among Ex-Soviet Migrants in Israel, in E. Lederhendler and U. Rebhun (eds.) *Research in Jewish Demography and Identity*. Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 146–168; Tolts, M. 2016. Demography of the contemporary Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora, in Z. Gitelman (ed.) *The new Jewish diaspora: Russian-speaking immigrants in the United States, Israel, and Germany*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 23–40; Konstantinov, V. 2017. *Chetvert' veka Bolshoi alii: Statisticheskii analiz peremen* (Quarter century of the great aliya: A statistical analysis of changes). Jerusalem: Lira; Tolts, M. 2018. Post-Soviet Jewish Demographic Dynamics: An Analysis of Recent Data, in S. DellaPergola and U. Rebhun (eds.) *Jewish Population and Identity: Concept and Reality*. Cham: Springer, 213–229; L. Gudkov L. and K. Pipiya with participation of N. Zorkaya and E. Kochergina. 2028. Xenophobia, racism and antisemitism parameters in present-day Russia; Report on the sociological research conducted by the Levada Center as commissioned by the RJC, August 2018. Moscow: Russian Jewish Congress, Levada Center, World Jewish Congress, Euro-Asian Jewish Congress; Tolts, M. 2019. A Half Century of Jewish Emigration from the Former Soviet Union: Demographic Aspects. Paper presented at the seminar on Russian and Eurasian Jewry, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

a recent surge in Jewish emigration, and an extremely elderly age composition. The continuing population decrease was only partially compensated by migration to Russia from other FSU republics and a moderate number of returns of previous migrants to Israel. The decline of the Jewish population has occurred in the context of a country whose general population has been diminishing for years. We evaluate Russia's core Jewish population at 155,000 in 2020.

Ukraine⁶⁴

The December 2001 census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews. The 2010 census could not be implemented because of instability, internal divisions, and war in Ukraine which, among many other consequences, resulted in continuing Jewish emigration and population decline. Between 1989 and 2001, the Jewish population – 80% of whom were Russian speakers – diminished more sharply in the western regions of the country where the share of Russians was relatively lower. The patterns of decline of



The December 2001 census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews. The 2010 census could not be implemented because of instability, internal divisions, and war in Ukraine which, among many other consequences, resulted in continuing Jewish emigration and population decline

ethnic Russians were similar. The overwhelming concentration of Ukraine's Jews living in regions with a predominantly Russian (and often pro-Russian) environment and affected by active warfare inevitably had negative consequences for the Jewish community. The 2001 census included 5,816 Jews in Crimea, subsequently annexed by Russia, where, in 2014, a special census found 3,374 Jews. Taking into account continuing emigration and a negative balance of Jewish births and deaths, we assess the core Jewish population at 45,000.

Other countries

In **Belarus**⁶⁵ the census of 2009 reported 12,900 Jews. Allowing for emigration since then, our 2020 estimate is 8,500. In **Moldova**⁶⁶ the census of 2014 reported 1,597 Jews in the main part of the country west of the Dniester River. A census of the Moldovan territory east of the Dniester reported 700 Jews – bringing the total at that time to 2,300. Taking into account continuing emigration and a negative balance of Jewish births and deaths, our estimate for 2020 is 1,900.

Other countries in Europe

The total Core Jewish population of other countries and territories in Europe is estimated at 330,200, of whom 292,000 are based in the UK and 38,200 in the sum of the other countries. The population with Jewish parents was 378,000, the Enlarged Jewish population 425,000, and the Law of Return population 472,100.

64 Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics. 2002. *Population census 2001*. Kiev: Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics; Tolts, M. 2002. *Main demographic trends of the Jews in Russia and the FSU*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry; Rosstat. 2014. *Special population census of Crimea 2014*. Moscow: Rosstat.

65 Belstat. 2009. *Population Census of Belarus 2009*. http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/2009/vihod_tables/5.8-0.pdf

66 Korazim, M., and E. Katz. 2003. Patterns of Jewish identity in Moldova: The behavioral dimension, in Z. Gitelman, B. Kosmin, and A. Kovács (eds.) *New Jewish identities: Contemporary Europe and beyond*. Budapest-New York: Central European University, 159–170; Statistica Moldovei. 2014. *Population and Housing Census in the Republic of Moldova, May 12–25, 2014*. Kishinev: National Bureau of Statistics; Republic of Moldova, National Bureau of Statistics. 2017. *Anuarul statistic al Republicii Moldova*. Chişinău: National Bureau of Statistics.

United Kingdom⁶⁷

The UK is the European country with the best set of usable data to document the Jewish population today. These include national population censuses in 2001 and 2011, independent surveys, Jewish vital statistics and detailed information on Jewish community membership and Jewish education. The 2011 census, including regional totals for Scotland and Northern Ireland, suggested a slight Jewish population increase, from 266,740 in 2001 to 271,259 in 2011 (+1.69%). The 2001 census underestimated the Jewish population, especially in areas inhabited by the more religious sectors of UK Jewry. In 2011, the response rate significantly increased in those areas. Overall, those who did not report a religion rose from 23% nationally in 2001, but in view of the encouragement by the organised Jewish community's to participate in the Census, the Jewish population was probably

less affected by the increase in *no religion* and *not reported*. Vital statistics collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Institute for Jewish Policy Research on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns. A reversal occurred in recent years from a negative to a positive balance of Jewish births and deaths. Inter-marriage was rising, though at moderate levels compared with most other European and Western countries. Synagogue membership in the UK significantly decreased over time. In 2016, 79,597 Jewish households in the UK held synagogue membership, against 92,653 in 1995, while total Jewish households declined from 147,349 in 2001 to 141,503 in 2016. Pupils in Jewish schools were increasing, particularly but not exclusively in the haredi sector, confirming the growing impact of the haredi sector on the Jewish birth

67 United Kingdom Office for National Statistics. 2002. *National report for England and Wales 2001*. London: United Kingdom Office for National Statistics; United Kingdom, Scotland General Register Office. 2002. *2001 Census*. Edinburgh: Scotland General Register Office; United Kingdom, National Records of Scotland (NRS). 2011. *2011 Scotland's Census*. www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/; United Kingdom Office for National Statistics. 2012. *2011 Population Census*. www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census/2011ukcensuses/ukcensusesdata; Miller, S., M. Schmool, and A. Lerman. 1996. *Social and political attitudes of British Jews: Some key findings of the JPR survey*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Kosmin, B., and S. Waterman. 2002. *Commentary on census religion question*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; *Report on community vital statistics 2004*. London: The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit; Graham, D., and S. Waterman. 2005. Underenumeration of the Jewish Population in the UK 2001 Census. *Population, Space and Place* 11: 89–102; Graham, D.J., and S. Waterman. 2007. 'Locating Jews by ethnicity: A reply to David Voas 2007.' *Population, Space and Place* 13: 409–414; Graham, D., M. Schmool, and S. Waterman. 2007. *Jews in Britain: A snapshot from the 2001 census*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Graham, D., and D. Vulkan. 2007. *Britain's Jewish community statistics*. London: Board of Deputies of British Jews; Voas, D. 2007. 'Estimating the Jewish undercount in the 2001 census: A comment on Graham and Waterman 2005'. *Population, Space and Place* 13: 401–407; Vulkan, D., and D. Graham. 2008. *Population trends among Britain's strictly orthodox*. London: Board of Deputies of British Jews; Graham, D.J. 2008. *The socio-spatial boundaries of an 'invisible' minority: A quantitative reappraisal of Britain's Jewish population*. Oxford: University of Oxford, St Catherine's College, Unpublished PhD thesis; Graham, D., and D. Vulkan. 2008. *Britain's Jewish community statistics*. London: Board of Deputies of British Jews; Graham, D., and D. Vulkan. 2010. *Synagogue membership in the United Kingdom in 2010*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research and The Board of Deputies of British Jews; Graham, D. 2011. 'Enumerating Britain's Jewish population: reassessing the 2001 census in the context of one hundred years of indirect estimates.' *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 53, 7–28; Graham, D., J. Boyd, and D. Vulkan. 2012. *2011 census results England and Wales: Initial insights about the UK Jewish population*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Vulkan, D. 2012. *Britain's Jewish Community Statistics 2010*. London: Board of Deputies of British Jews; Graham, D. 2013a. *2011 census results thinning and thickening: Geographical change in the UK's Jewish population, 2001–2011*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Graham D. 2013b. *2011 Census Results (England and Wales): A Tale of Two Jewish Populations*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Boyd, J., and L. Staetsky. 2013. 'United Kingdom,' in Staetsky, L., J. Boyd, E. Ben-Rafael, E. Cohen, S. DellaPergola, L. Dencik, O. Glöckner, and A. Kovács. *Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in selected EU member states*, 121–124. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research/Ipsos MORI (unpublished); Graham, D., and M.L. Caputo. 2015. *Jewish families and Jewish households: Census insights about how we live*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Staetsky, L.D., and J. Boyd. 2015. *Strictly Orthodox Rising: what the demography of British Jew tells us about the future of the community*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Staetsky, D., and J. Boyd. 2016. *The rise and rise of Jewish schools in the United Kingdom. Numbers, trends and policy*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Graham, D. 2016. *Jews in couples. Marriage, intermarriage, cohabitation and divorce in Britain*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Casale Mashiah, D., and J. Boyd. 2017. *Synagogue membership in the United Kingdom in 2016*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Casale Mashiah, D. 2018. *Vital Statistics of the UK Jewish population: births and deaths*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research; Collins, K., A. Newman, B. Wasserstein, N. Lamdan, M. Tobias (eds.) 2018. *Two Hundred Years of Scottish Jewry*. Glasgow: Merchant City Print; Boyd, J. 2019. Numbers of Jewish children in Jewish schools: Statistical bulletin for 2015/16 to 2017/18, *JPR Statistical Bulletin*. London: JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research and Board of Deputies of British Jews.

rate. Allowing for immigration and emigration, we set our estimate for the UK's core Jewish population at 292,000.

Other Western Europe

In **Switzerland**⁶⁸ at the end of 2018, according to census data and current updates, the Jewish population aged 15 and over was 16,275. Allowing for children below 15 and migration data, the total Jewish population is estimated at 18,500 for 2020 – stable if minimally decreasing. In **Norway**⁶⁹ the national register of religious and life stance communities found 809 Jews on 1 January 2019, an increase of 8.3% over the previous five years. Our 2020 estimate is 1,300.



In Turkey a 2002 survey in Istanbul indicated widespread ageing in a community that has since experienced growing emigration and population decline. Most of the country's Jews live in Istanbul's European neighbourhoods. The estimate for 2020 is 14,600

Balkan countries

In **Turkey**⁷⁰ a 2002 survey in Istanbul indicated widespread ageing in a community that has since experienced growing emigration and

population decline. Most of the country's Jews live in Istanbul's European neighbourhoods. The estimate for 2020 is 14,600. In **Serbia**,⁷¹ prior to the conflicts of the 1990s, there were approximately 1,600 Jews by ethnicity. According to the 2002 census, there were 785 Jews by religion. The 2011 census reported 578 Jews, mostly in Belgrade. We estimate the total for 2020 at 1,400. In **Bosnia-Herzegovina**⁷² the civil war of the early 1990s caused dramatic disruption. At the peak of the crisis, part of the Sarajevo Jewish community was evacuated. We assume a core Jewish population of 500 in 2020. In **North Macedonia**⁷³ the 2002 census found 53 Jews. We estimate a tiny Jewish population of 100.

Other countries and territories

We estimate the current Jewish population of **Gibraltar** at 800 using census findings of 584 in 2001 and 763 in 2012, and based on Jewish community records and some emigration of younger people.⁷⁴ The consequences of Brexit for the Jewish community of this British enclave with some fiscal advantages over the EU will have to be evaluated. In the Principality of **Monaco**,⁷⁵ whose economy is based on tourism, gambling and services, the Jewish population was estimated at 700 based on a recent local survey. The British dependency of the **Channel Islands**,⁷⁶ a small transnational financial centre, had an estimated Jewish population of about 200, mostly on the Island of Jersey with a few in Guernsey,

68 Statistik Schweiz. 2005. *Wohnbevölkerung nach Religion 2000*. Neuchatel: Bundesamt für Statistik. Statistik Schweiz. 2012. *Ständige Wohnbevölkerung ab 15 Jahren nach Religionszugehörigkeit, 2012*. Neuchatel: Bundesamt für Statistik; Statistik Schweiz. 2018. *Religionszugehörigkeit nach Kantonen, 2018 Ständige Wohnbevölkerung ab 15 Jahren*. Neuchatel: Bundesamt für Statistik; Gerson, D. 2010. *Schweizer Judentum im Wandel, Religionswandel und gesellschaftspolitische Orientierungen der Juden in der Schweiz*. Basel: Institut für Jüdische Studien der Universität Basel.

69 Statistics Norway. 2019. www.ssb.no/en/kultur-og-fritid/statistikk/trosamf/aar/2019-12-03. Oslo: Statistics Norway.

70 Filiba, L. 2003. *Turkish Jewish community demographic survey 2002-3*. Istanbul: Jewish Community of Turkey Council; Tuval, S. 2004. *The Jewish community of Istanbul, 1948-1992*. Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute (in Hebrew); Kubovich, Y. 2016. Turkish Jews Say Raising Anti-Semitism Will Drive Next Generation Away. *Haaretz*, July 3.

71 Peric, Demographic study, cit.; Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia PBC. 2013. *Census 2011, Religion, Mother tongue and Ethnicity*. Belgrade: PBC.

72 Joshua Project. 2020. *Bringing definition to the unfinished task*. <https://joshuaproject.net/countries/BK>

73 Republic of Macedonia, State Statistical Office. 2014. *Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002*. Skopje: State Statistical Office.

74 HM Government of Gibraltar. 2012. *Census of Gibraltar 2012*. Gibraltar: Statistics Office; Benaim, D. and Belilo, M. Jewish community of Gibraltar. 2019. Personal communication.

75 Joshua Project. 2020. *Bringing definition to the unfinished task*. <https://joshuaproject.net/countries/MN>

76 Bailiwick of Jersey, Gov.je. 2020. *2011 Census*. www.gov.je/Government/JerseyInFigures/Population/Pages/Population.aspx; BBC. 2010. Jersey's Jewish community is 'in decline'. August 15. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-jersey-10981345

according to a 2015 Annual population survey. A few more countries and territories have a sporadic permanent Jewish presence, none of which reached the threshold of 100 individuals.⁷⁷ A few tens remained in **Albania**⁷⁸ after the near complete exodus in 1991, and even fewer in the former Yugoslav republic of **Montenegro**⁷⁹ (12 Jews in 2007), and the newly independent

Kosovo, and in **Iceland**. Tiny numbers of Jews live in micro-states such as **Andorra**, **Liechtenstein**⁸⁰ (18 Jews in 2002), **San Marino**, and in the Danish dependency of the **Faroe Islands**. The **Holy See** has no known Jews unless one counts Israel's ambassador and his staff (the Israeli embassy is actually located in Rome).

77 None of these countries is listed with at least 100 Jews in: Joshua Project. 2020. *Bringing definition to the unfinished task*, <https://joshuaproject.net/global/countries>

78 Eugene Register Guard. 1991. Jewish exodus from Albania ends. April 12.

79 Statistical Office of Montenegro. 2007. *Statistical Yearbook of Montenegro*. Podgorica: Monstat.

80 Fürstentum Liechtenstein, Amt für Statistik. 2010. *Volkszählung 2010*. Vaduz: Amt für Statistik; U.S. Department of State. 2005. International Religion Freedom Report. Washington: DC. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51564.htm>

5 / Mechanisms of demographic change

Jewish population change is determined by a known set of demographic factors which can increase or decrease the number of Jews in the whole of Europe or in any given country over time. Formally, in the fundamental demographic equation, **P(t)** signifies the population size at any point in time, called **t**, and **P(t-1)** is the population size at a preceding point in time; **B** and **D** stand for the number of births and deaths, respectively; **I** and **E** stand for immigration into and emigration from the given population; **A** and **S** stand for the numbers of accessions and secessions, i.e. conversions or other modes of identificational change, into and out of the Jewish community, respectively.

$$P(t) = P(t-1) + (B-D) + (I-E) + (A-S)$$

Unfortunately, the demographic data currently available on Jews in Europe are not sufficient to translate the equation into accurate numbers. However there exist abundant and significant indications about the size and characteristics of the major demographic factors involved, and the respective directions of change. These are reviewed briefly here.

International migration


Immigration

Migration has played a very significant role in the demographic reshaping of European Jewry. Large scale immigration compensated and replenished to some extent the rank and file of European communities after the Shoah, and also acted as a balancing factor in many countries where negative Jewish population trends developed following a negative balance between births and deaths. The volume of Jewish immigration

especially after the Second World War was quite different across Europe, as demonstrated in Figure 10, which displays the percentage of foreign-born among the Jewish populations of 12 EU countries in 2018.

The highest proportions of immigrant Jews appear, not unexpectedly – albeit for different reasons – in Spain and Germany. Some may note the irony inherent in the demographic revival through migration of the two locations whose names in Hebrew – *Sepharad* and *Ashkenaz*, respectively – have been used to define the historical ethno-cultural typology of the origins of Diaspora Jewish communities. The smaller community in Spain drew immigrants from the former Spanish Morocco territory in North Africa, but also more recently from a variety of Latin American countries. Germany is the country whose Jewish community grew the most since the 1990s, thanks to a large inflow from the former Soviet Union (as already noted in Table 1). Other Jewish communities which benefited to some extent because of immigration from Eastern Europe include Denmark, Austria, and at an earlier stage, Sweden. France and Belgium still carry the signs of the large immigration from North Africa between the 1950s and early 1970s. The UK and the Netherlands (with significant contingents of Israelis) and Italy (from a variety of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries including Libya and Iran) also received their contingents of Jewish immigrants which positively affected their respective population balances. The least affected were Poland and Hungary. These countries were apparently not sufficiently attractive targets for Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union – besides possibly constituting lands of transit, they did not have a colonial legacy, and they were far less developed than western European countries.

Figure 10. Percentage of foreign-born among Jewish populations in 12 EU countries, 2018



Source: 2018 FRA Survey, weighted data.


In the broader framework of Jewish immigration to Europe, Israel was one visible supplier of immigrants. Yet the high estimates sometimes heard about the numbers of Israelis in Europe do not find sufficient support in the available statistical sources. According to the latest available data from European statistical authorities, close to 70,000 people who were born in Israel reside permanently in Europe. Over 60% of the Israelis, a short-hand term we will employ here for Jews born in Israel, reside in the four largest Jewish communities of Europe: the UK (about 18,000), Germany (10,000), France (9,000), and the Netherlands (6,000).

As shown in Figure 11, Israelis constitute a stabilising or reinforcing element in the overall demographic patterns of European Jewish communities. In fact, it appears that the number of Israelis in Europe at the beginning of the 2010s, most of them in EU countries, closely matched

the total number of migrants to Israel from the EU between 2000 and 2019 (see below). Based on a rough ratio between the numbers of Israelis available for each country and that country's more recent core Jewish population estimate, Israelis have come to represent substantial proportions of the total Jewish communities in several European countries – mostly where Jewish populations are small: over 40% in Norway, Finland and Slovenia, 20–30% in Spain, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands, and over 10% in Luxembourg, Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Belgium, Malta, Italy and Poland. These estimates, however, should be understood with caution. First, they may include a share of persons with identities other than Jewish, namely Israeli Arabs and others not included as part of the core Jewish population which constitutes the baseline for these computations. Moreover, the numbers include those Israeli-born persons who are the children of former immigrants to Israel from a given country, and who subsequently returned to the country of origin or moved to a third country with their parents. On the other hand, they may not include Israeli immigrants to the given country born in a third country and/or holders of the citizenship of that country.

Israelis may have been reluctant at first to integrate into the mainstream Jewish community system of European countries, but eventually many did – either as suppliers or customers of Jewish community services. Israeli pupils are bound to constitute a visible share of all children in Jewish schools, and by the same token, teachers of Jewish studies and other specialists employed in the Jewish community framework may be Israelis. As time goes on, the relationship of former Israelis to Israel and to local Jewish community life, including those who were born there, may turn out to be not too different from that of other local Jews.

Figure 11. Percentage of people born in Israel out of total core Jewish populations in selected European countries around 2011^a



^a Except Lithuania 2015, Ireland, 2016, Belgium and the Netherlands, 2019.

Source: for Israelis by country of birth for all countries except the Netherlands, Belgium, Lithuania and Ireland. European Commission, Eurostat, *2011 Population and Housing Census Database of Europe*. The Netherlands: people born in Israel with at least one Israeli-born parent permanently living in the country. CBS-Netherlands, 2019. Belgium: people born in Israel and permanently living in the country, StatBel, 2019. Ireland: Israeli-born Jews, 2016, Central Statistics Office. Lithuania: people born in Israel and permanently living in the country, Statistics Lithuania. 2015.

A large-scale study of Israelis worldwide in 2009–2010, that included a European sample, found that social integration, combining duration of residence and receiving citizenship in the country of residence, enhanced Jewish religio-ethnic identification. In other words, Jewish Israelis tended to become more like local Jews. On the other hand, another measure of integration, social networks in a non-Jewish context, weakened Jewish identification. All measures of general integration in the new country inhibited attachment to the home country – Israel. The more opportunities newcomers received, the more they disassociated from both Jewish group behaviours and Israel homeland ties.⁸¹

Emigration

Europe has experienced much higher levels of Jewish emigration than Jewish immigration over the past few decades. The only country for which reliable data on Jewish immigrants by single country of origin are available is Israel. Table 3 reports detailed and largely unpublished data on *aliyah* covering the twenty year period from 2000–2019.

Israel immigration data, it should be noted, refer to eligible persons defined according to the Law of Return which, as explained above, defines a larger constituency than the core Jewish population. During the years 2001–2018, 43% of all new immigrants were not registered as

81 Rebhun, U. 2014. Immigrant Acculturation and Transnationalism: Israelis in the United States and Europe Compared. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 53(3):613–635.

Table 3. Number of new immigrants to Israel by country of origin, 2000–2019

Year	2000–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014	2015–2019	Total
Total Europe	119,708	46,004	58,004	111,113	334,829
Total EU 27	13,750	13,635	19,134	23,098	69,617
Austria	61	65	97	159	382
Belgium	429	464	946	732	2,571
Bulgaria	584	138	119	51	892
Croatia	173	21	20	11	225
Cyprus	6	9	6	61	82
Czechia	60	43	42	70	215
Denmark	39	50	48	55	192
Estonia	216	38	57	30	341
Finland	24	18	31	36	109
France	7,981	10,406	14,494	18,574	51,455
Germany	338	486	486	716	2,026
Greece	25	24	46	64	159
Hungary	476	350	595	290	1,711
Ireland	18	25	18	30	91
Italy	156	255	784	771	1,966
Latvia	1,003	240	264	272	1,779
Lithuania	893	111	97	154	1,255
Luxembourg	1	5	7	10	23
Malta	0	0	1	11	12
Netherlands	198	216	216	274	904
Poland	114	143	102	101	460
Portugal	5	14	25	33	77
Romania	728	240	209	69	1,246
Slovenia	0	0	1	0	1
Slovakia	58	27	5	13	103
Spain	79	147	311	394	931
Sweden	85	100	107	117	409
Total other not-FSU	2,455	3,663	3,469	4,250	13,837
Albania	1	0	2	8	11
Andorra	0	1	5	4	10
Bosnia	1	2	2	1	6
Gibraltar	5	1	2	12	20
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	1	1
Macedonia	7	11	4	4	26
Monaco	4	1	8	19	32
Norway	15	9	8	14	46
Serbia	3	46	42	37	128
Switzerland	401	362	403	411	1,577

Table 3 continued. Number of new immigrants to Israel by country of origin, 2000–2019

Year	2000–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014	2015–2019	Total
Turkey	415	478	418	1,038	2,349
UK	1,603	2,752	2,575	2,701	9,631
Total FSU not-EU	103,503	28,706	35,401	83,765	251,375
Belarus	6,732	2,204	1,650	3,761	14,347
Moldova	3,963	1,191	1,041	889	7,084
Russia	44,919	16,841	19,206	46,868	127,834
Ukraine	47,889	8,470	13,504	32,247	102,110
[Total FSU in Europe]	105,615	29,095	35,819	84,221	254,750

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data.

Note: the higher figure in each row is outlined.

Jewish.⁸² Regarding immigration from the FSU, the rate of non-Jews exceeded the 50% threshold in the 2000s, and in recent years it reached 70%.⁸³ This is consistent with the typology of Jewish population size according to alternative definitions outlined in the previous chapter. It is important to stress that the data reported here refer to people who entered as new immigrants. As some of them may have left Israel in subsequent years, the number of current Israeli residents who arrived from a given country of origin is actually lower.

All in all, nearly 335,000 Jews and members of their families left Europe for Israel between 2000 and 2020 – that is after much larger numbers had already left, especially during the 1990s. Of these, over 250,000 (75%) came from the former Soviet republics in Europe; nearly 70,000 came from the 27 EU countries; and nearly 14,000 came from other European countries, mainly the UK. Over two-thirds of the total came from Russia and



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Ukraine alone. After the two former Soviet republics, France was by far the third main supplier of new immigrants to Israel from Europe, with over 51,000 (15% of the total). Two other main countries of origin were Belarus (over 14,000) and Moldova (over 7,000). Other countries that supplied over 2,000 new immigrants each between 2000 and 2020 included Belgium, Turkey, and Germany, while Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Switzerland, Lithuania, and Romania supplied over 1,000 each. Every single European country contributed

82 Fisher, N. 2019. "Non-Jews" immigration to Israel from the 1990s onward: Continuity or a Turning Point in Israel's Immigration Policy? Unpublished paper.

83 Ibid.

at least some new immigrants to Israel, including Slovenia and Lichtenstein, who provided one each.

Figure 12 shows in graphical form the data in Table 3 for the major geographical divisions of Europe and for the main countries in the format

of ratios of the number of immigrants in each five-year period in relation to the number in 2000–2004. The value of the ratio in 2000–2004 is 1 for each geographical unit, and it grows or diminishes according to changes in the migration volume over time.

Figure 12. Pace of change of number of new immigrants to Israel by major geographical divisions, 2000–2019 – Ratios of number in each period to number (= 1) in 2000–2004



Source: Table 3.

Note: Different scales used on left axis. The category 'Other' in the bottom left panel includes the following countries: Albania, Andorra, Cyprus, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Portugal.


The pace of total European Jewish migration to Israel during the first twenty years of the twenty-first century followed a U-shape: it was higher during the initial period 2000–2004, with nearly 120,000, followed by a marked slow-down in 2005–2009 (46,000), a subsequent recovery in 2010–2014 (58,000), and a significant increase in 2015–2019 (111,000). Intensity over time, however, was quite different across countries of origin and reflected the variable influence of changing local realities. Five different models can be detected. The overall continental U shape was influenced by the pace of migration from the former FSU republics, which in 2000–2004 were still affected by the wave of migration initiated in 1990–1991.

Russia, Ukraine and Belarus witnessed a substantial Jewish emigration revival in more recent years. Among the reasons was a significant lowering of the standard of living, prompted in part by diminished national revenues due to falling prices of crude oil, of which Russia was a main producer.⁸⁴ Countries of the EU and other European countries displayed a pattern of gradual intensification of immigration, with the exception of former Communist countries, which experienced generally declining numbers. Regarding Western Europe, the number of immigrants to Israel from UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and the Nordic countries in 2015–2019 was roughly 50% higher than in 2000–2004; in France, Germany, Austria, Greece and Turkey it was roughly 2.5 time higher; and in Italy, Spain and the aggregate of other small Jewish populations it was five times higher. Jewish population size in each European country was significantly affected by these movements.

Regarding prospective migration, the 2018 FRA survey investigated to what extent respondents were considering emigration and if so, to which country, and whether they were making active

preparations to that effect. Figure 13 shows the emigration propensities of Jews in 12 EU countries. Overall, the vast majority planned to remain in their countries of residence in Europe. The range varied between 92% in Italy and 84% in the Netherlands. Among possible countries of destination Israel clearly dominated, with a share of interested respondents ranging from 11% in the Netherlands to 5% in Hungary. Considering the development of migration to Israel over the last twenty years, the countries covered here seemed to have passed the emigration peak that could be detected around the mid- to late 2010s.⁸⁵

Figure 13. Percentages of those making active preparations for emigrating by preferred country of destination among Jews in 12 EU countries, 2018



Source: 2018 FRA Survey, weighted data.

84 DellaPergola, S. 2020. Macrosocial aspects of ethnic migration to Israel, 1991–2019: Diaspora vs. homeland. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University (unpublished paper).

85 On past and prospective trends in Jewish migration from Europe see: DellaPergola, S. 2020. Jewish Demography in the European Union – Virtuous and Vicious Paths, in H. Fireberg, O. Glöckner, M. Zoufalá (eds.) *Being Jewish in Central Europe Today*. Berlin: De Gruyter (forthcoming); Staetsky, L.D. 2017. *Are Jews leaving Europe?* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research/JPR.

Marriage and fertility

Growth, or at least the numerical stability of a population – Jewish or other – depends primarily on its ability to reproduce itself. Reproductive processes typically take place within a family unit. Throughout history, the family has traditionally constituted a powerful engine for the transmission of both life and cultural values from one generation to the next. Marriage and the nuclear family have long constituted the main vehicle of Jewish family formation, although in the present generation, new forms of union and cohabitation are playing a more important role alongside conventional family frameworks. Despite recent changes in preferences and behaviours – such as the growing frequency of registered partnerships of people who are not formally married, single parent families, or same-sex families – these have not superseded the central role of the family in the birth and socialisation of children in general, nor of Jewish children in particular.

Therefore, the frequency of marriage constitutes an important indicator of the likelihood that a new generation will be born to replace the present one. Table 4 presents the percentages



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of Jewish adults who never married or are not in a registered partnership, by age, in the 12 EU countries covered by the 2018 FRA survey. Countries are ranked from left to right according to the percentage of Jewish women who had never married at age 30–39, rising from lowest to highest. The focus on this age group in the female population has much to do with the fact that this is the most common age range for women to have children in contemporary societies.

Table 4. Percentage of Jews never married nor in a registered partnership by age and sex in 12 EU countries, 2018

Age and sex	Belgium	Sweden	Hungary	Denmark	Spain	Germany	Austria	Netherlands	Poland	France	UK	Italy
Women												
16–29	42.7	66.3	96.3	68.5	87.9	80.8	73.6	87.3	69.7	79.5	83.2	94.1
30–39	8.0	18.1	24.3	25.6	27.4	27.6	30.8	31.7	33.3	34.0	34.3	46.2
40–49	6.5	4.8	23.6	2.9	5.9	10.7	7.1	20.6	21.2	12.1	16.9	22.2
50–59	11.1	12.1	16.7	7.3	21.6	12.6	10.3	18.0	11.1	17.6	15.6	14.3
60–69	4.5	3.6	7.8	6.8	11.1	6.4	9.3	8.3	3.8	16.8	13.4	5.7
70+	1.7	5.3	11.8	7.0	0.0	12.2	12.5	4.2	13.3	8.6	5.3	9.2
Men												
16–29	48.5	60.0	100.0	81.7	77.8	89.5	87.5	94.1	73.1	82.6	68.7	90.3
30–39	14.1	24.3	36.1	28.6	39.6	41.1	30.2	25.2	27.8	24.6	24.7	55.8
40–49	3.6	5.9	10.9	8.5	17.2	9.6	11.1	25.0	11.5	8.5	13.5	18.2
50–59	12.2	6.6	4.0	7.0	7.0	16.0	14.6	9.8	0.0	8.7	11.2	14.5
60–69	7.7	2.5	1.8	3.3	1.9	8.0	4.8	13.9	0.0	6.1	6.7	7.9
70+	2.6	2.8	0.0	0.0	12.5	11.4	3.6	5.8	0.0	1.3	4.1	1.7

Source: 2018 FRA Survey, weighted data.

The resulting percentages are the combined results of many factors, including the proportion that is haredi in the total Jewish population and the prevalence and social acceptability of cohabitation. The latter factors are especially strong in some countries – e.g. in Scandinavia – where stable partnerships in which children are born are very common.

The percentages in each cell should be taken with some caution because in some countries where the FRA sample was small, the absolute number of observations can be very small. Yet bearing in mind this caveat, the overall findings are quite coherent. Sharp intra-continental differences prevail in Jewish marriage patterns. Such variations based on data available for the first time are unexpectedly consistent with hypotheses based on historical accounts of the family in Europe, and on the Jewish family in particular.⁸⁶ East-West and North-South differentials which are typical of total populations also characterise Jews. Belgium displays by far the lowest percentage of Jewish women, and of men, who are still unmarried at age 30–39: only 8% of women and 14% of men. This is the result of a younger age at marriage, which, in turn, is known to characterise the more religious circles that constitute an important share of the Jewish community in Antwerp and in Belgium at large. At the opposite extreme, Italy shows percentages of never married at 46% among Jewish women and 56% among Jewish men aged 30–39. This is not surprising in view of the known postponement and decline in the frequency of marriage among Italy's total population. Among Jews in other countries, Sweden displays relatively low levels of singlehood, followed by Hungary, Spain, Denmark and Germany – all below 30% among women. Austria, Netherlands, Poland, France and the UK feature percentages of women aged 30–39 who have never married above 30%. Among men the ranking of countries is somewhat different: Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, France and the UK all have percentages of never married

below 30%, while Austria, Hungary, Spain and Germany all have percentages above 30%.


The data on those who never married and have reached older ages are also of interest. While in the past marriage was nearly universal among Jewish communities, the FRA sample shows that in some countries one in ten or even one in eight never married. If similar or higher percentages of non-marriage were attained by those who are currently younger adults, that would predict demographic stagnation and decline in this generation. Quite consistently across our transnational sample, the age cohort 50–59 (born 1959–1968) displays higher percentages of non-marriage than the immediately younger or older cohorts. These people were reaching their prime marriage age during the 1980s and 1990s and the reason for that little bulge of final singlehood, especially notable among men, may be due to a temporary unavailability of marriage candidates of appropriate age (due to previous fluctuations of fertility), or other social, economic and community circumstances.

The same data are represented for a selection of countries in Figure 14. The critical differences in family formation models clearly underlie the variable chances of Jewish communities in different countries to maintain their size through generational replacement. Earlier and more frequent marriage in countries like Belgium, or more frequent cohabitation as in Sweden, predicts greater chances of Jewish demographic continuity than late or non-marriage in countries like Germany or Italy.

Figure 15 outlines an indirect measure of Jewish demographic reproduction by showing the distribution of households covered by the 2018 FRA survey in 12 EU countries. Household size is evidently affected by the number of children who are resident in those households, although the actual number of children ever-born is certainly higher than the numbers


86 Hajnal, J. 1965. European marriage pattern in historical perspective, in D.V. Glass and D.E.C. Eversley (eds.) *Population in History*. London: Arnold 101–143; Kertzer, D.I. and M. Barbagli. 2001. *The history of the European family*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Figure 14. Percentage of Jews never married nor in registered partnership by age in 4 EU countries, 2018



Source: Table 4.

Figure 15. Jewish household size in 12 EU countries, 2018, percentages



Source: 2018 FRA Survey, weighted data.

shown because some of them will have already left home to set up their own independent households. Countries are ranked from high to low according to the percentage of households with four or more members (regardless of the Jewish identification of those people).

Once again, Belgium emerges at the high end of the distribution, with over 40% of households with four members or more. Spain, the UK and Italy follow with 30–40% of such households, followed, in turn, by Austria, Germany, France and Hungary with 20–30%. Former Communist


and Northern European countries feature the smaller households with a clear predominance of one and two-person households. Average household sizes resulted as follows: Belgium 3.32; Spain 3.03; UK 2.96; Italy 2.86; Austria 2.76; France 2.67; Germany 2.62; Hungary 2.61; Denmark 2.41; Sweden 2.38; Netherlands 2.32; Poland 2.32. These averages also incorporate non-Jewish members of Jewish households. The data indirectly indicate quite low numbers of children at home, and by implication, low fertility levels. Particularly in those countries – namely Italy – where marriage is postponed to relatively later ages or does not occur, households often host “children” in their late 20s or 30s.

Fertility levels and the numbers of children in Jewish families in Europe will be analysed more thoroughly in a forthcoming report by JPR’s European Jewish Demography Unit.⁸⁷

Intermarriage

A further important variable in the demographic development of Jewish populations is the propensity to marry within or outside the Jewish community.⁸⁸ Especially since the second half of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century in Europe, intermarriage constituted a significant factor of erosion in Jewish population size. The main reason was the non-attribution of a Jewish identity to large shares of the children born to intermarried couples, who received the religious and/or ethnic identity of the non-Jewish parent instead.⁸⁹

Figure 16. Percentage married to non-Jewish spouses in 12 EU countries, 2018



Source: FRA 2018 Survey, weighted data.

Figure 16 presents the percentages of Jews married to non-Jewish partners among officially constituted families based on the 2018 FRA study in 12 EU countries. The data refer to religion at the time of survey, not at the time of birth. Any possible effect of intervening conversions is therefore not represented in the following description. More detailed analyses will follow in a future report. These figures are overall quite consistent with estimates from other sources.⁹⁰ Extreme differences appear across countries, with former Communist and Northern European countries showing shares of intermarriage above 50% (the highest being Poland with

87 Staetsky, L.D., and S. DellaPergola, forthcoming. *Jewish fertility in Europe*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

88 See a detailed repertory of historical data on intermarriage levels in European and other countries in: DellaPergola, S. 1972. *Jewish and Mixed Marriages in Milan, 1901–1968; with an Appendix: Frequency of Mixed Marriages among Diaspora Jews*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Jewish Population Studies, 3, 166 pp.


89 For a recent ethnographic analysis, see: Gransard, C. 2005. *Juifs d’un côté: portraits de descendants de mariages mixtes entre juifs et chrétiens*. Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en ronde/Le Seuil. See also: Tanenbaum and Kooyman, 2014, cit. For previous work see: Goldberg, W., and W. Bok. 1970. *Dualité culturelle et appartenance. Les enfants nés d’un mariage dont un des conjoints est juif*. Bruxelles: Centre National des Hautes Études Juives; Bensimon, D., and F. Lautman. 1977. *Un mariage. Deux traditions: Crétiens et Juifs*. Bruxelles: Centre national des hautes études juives, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles; DellaPergola, S. 1983. L’effet des mariages mixtes sur la natalité dans une sous-population: quelques problèmes et résultats concernant la diaspora juive. *Démographie et destin des sous-populations*. Paris: Association Internationale des Démographes de Langue Française, 223–236.

90 DellaPergola, S. 2009. Jewish out-marriage: A global perspective, in S. Reinharz and S. DellaPergola (eds.) *Jewish intermarriage around the world*, 13–39. London-New Brunswick: Transaction; Graham, D. 2016. *Jews in couples. Marriage, intermarriage, cohabitation and divorce in Britain*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research/JPR.

76% intermarried), followed by Germany, Italy and Spain with levels around 35–45%, Austria and France just above 30%, the UK at 24%, and Belgium with the lowest frequency of 14% intermarried. The traditional community in Antwerp almost certainly affects Belgium’s data. The high percentages of intermarriage in Sweden interestingly combine with high marriage or stable partnership propensities, thus pointing to a somewhat contradictory role of family formation in Jewish demographic continuity there. Intermarriage not only impacts the nature of cultural interactions and Jewish community

participation on the part of concerned couples, but also decisively affects the future identity of children. The historical tendency in Europe has been to allocate a majority of children born to intermarried couples to the non-Jewish side.⁹¹ This pattern may have changed somewhat more recently by incorporating a rising share of such children to the Jewish side. It should be noted that the data on intermarriage do not include cohabiting couples who are not formally married, among whom the percentage of non-Jewish partners is expected to be much higher than among formally married couples.⁹²

Figure 17. Percentage married to non-Jewish spouses in 12 EU countries, by age and gender, 2018



Source: FRA 2018 Survey, weighted data. Countries ranked by the diminishing average intermarriage percentage of both genders.

91 Ibid.

92 See DellaPergola, S. 1992. Recent Trends in Jewish Marriage, in S. DellaPergola and L. Cohen (eds.) *World Jewish Population: Trends and Policies*, 56–92. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University; Cohen, E.H. 2007. *Heureux comme Juifs en France? Étude sociologique*. Jerusalem: Elkana et Akadem; Graham, 2016, *Jews in couples*, cit.

In Figure 17 the same data are disaggregated by gender and by two major age groups: below and above 50. This may provide some sense of the key directions of change in the propensities to outmarry in the different countries covered here. While the ranking of countries by intermarriage frequency is not very different among the older and the younger age groups, interestingly and perhaps unexpectedly, no clear trend emerges as to the increase of mixed couples over time (i.e. among the younger). In fact, in countries where intermarriage is generally more frequent (Poland, Sweden, Denmark, but also in Italy and Spain), the percentages are higher among those below 50 than among those older. But in the majority of countries (the Netherlands, Hungary, Germany, France, Austria, the UK and Belgium) some decline can be detected in the passage from the Jewish population's older age group to the younger one. The transition to lower intermarriage rates among younger people is particularly noticeable in Austria,⁹³ but is also strong in Hungary and Germany, and will be discussed in detail in a future JPR European Jewish Demography Unit report. This may be due to one or two somewhat opposing mechanisms. One is that the more assimilated part of the community is gradually being lost, and what remains is the more Jewishly motivated and active part which tends to keep stronger internal social relations. The other explanation may be that actual mechanisms of disassimilation are occurring in several Jewish communities of Europe, perhaps also due to a more visible and growing share of the more religious sections, including the haredim.

Gender differences, too, do not confirm the generally prevailing notion stemming from the past that intermarriage is more frequent among men than among women. Among married Jews below 50, five countries out of 12 displayed higher male than female intermarriage rates (Poland, Denmark, Hungary Italy, and Belgium), while in the other seven (mostly with medium to moderate intermarriage rates) women were more

prone to outmarriage. Among those 50 and older, four countries with higher male intermarriage rates include Hungary, Austria, Spain and Belgium, while in Germany the rate is the same for both genders.


Age composition

The age composition of a population is a critical variable in demographic analysis for two main reasons. First, it summarises the different influences of births in previous years, the levels of survival and longevity among a population, and the age composition of entering and exiting international migrants. Second, it may powerfully affect the likelihood of age-related demographic events, such as births, deaths and migration. Figure 18 presents a broad selection of data on European core Jewish populations by age composition. According to the respective structures, we have labelled the different populations as *traditional*, *transitional*, *ageing* and *terminal*. These terms address the resilience potential of a population, namely the share of children and younger adults, versus the share of older adults and elders. In the case of a Jewish population, the children and younger age cohorts considered refer only to those identified as Jewish, without including the several others who may have Jewish parents but are not actually identified as Jewish themselves.

The Jewish populations documented here cover a long span of more than a century and show the structural transformation from a *traditional* situation characterised by high birth rates, large families and high percentages of children that was typical of Eastern European Jewry at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and still prevailed much later in Jewish communities in Asia and Africa. A demographic *transitional* stage emerges when a reduction in the birth rate and improved longevity leads to a decline in the share of children below 15 and an increase in the share of those aged 65 and above, when the

93 L. D. Staetsky and S. DellaPergola, 2020, *Jews in Austria*, op. cit.

Figure 18. Age composition among selected European core Jewish populations, 1897–2018



*Hungary 1995 and 2015, Poland 2011: population with Jewish parents.

Source: Database of the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

children still outnumber the elderly – as is still the case in contemporary Israel. This occurred among large sections of European Jewry during the period between the two world wars, but similar age compositions were reported in Paris in the 1970s, due to the wave of immigration from North Africa in the preceding years, in Antwerp in the 1980s due to the high percentage of strictly religious Jews, and in Austria in recent years due to the growth of the local Jewish religious sector. An *ageing* population composition is characterised by a number of persons above 65 larger than the number of children under 15. This already emerged among German Jews in the

twentieth century interwar period, and became typical of most European Jewish communities, as abundantly exemplified in Figure 18.

The ageing process can be followed through by comparing the Jewish population in the same country at different dates, such as Romania in 1899 and 1979, Italy in 1965 and 2014, Germany in 1989 and 2018, or Russia in 1959 and 2010. We defined *terminal* those contemporary Jewish populations mostly in Central and Eastern Europe in which the elderly overwhelmingly outnumber the children. Whereas in the *traditional* age structure type the percentage under 15 was 40%

at least and the percentage over 65 was less than 5%, in the *terminal* type the proportions are reversed. The latter foreshadows high death rates and unavoidable future population decline.


In some countries observed at repeated dates it appears that some rejuvenation has occurred over time, contrary to the main historical trend toward ageing, mostly due to an increased presence of religious families among the total Jewish population. The main example is provided by the UK in 2011 versus earlier points in time, but also by Austria in 2016 versus 2001. It is also possible that the low shares of children and younger adults mask some undercounting of people of mixed Jewish/non-Jewish parentage who might choose to identify as Jews at a later stage of life.⁹⁴

Figure 19 reports a selection of data on age composition in the 12 EU countries covered in the 2018 FRA survey. The data selected refer to the percentage aged 16 to 29 versus the percentage aged 60 and over.

The FRA data derive from an open internet survey and therefore *do not* provide an accurate age profile of the population covered, as the propensity to participate in a survey accessed through the internet can vary quite significantly across age groups. Interestingly, in a previous FRA survey carried out in 2012 using a similar method, such age-related biases were not consistent, showing an overrepresentation of younger adults in some countries and of elders in others.⁹⁵

However, with all due caution regarding the representativeness of the sample, based on a consistent data set for 12 countries, the feature of Jewish ageing is overwhelmingly confirmed. All Jewish populations outlined display a substantial surplus of elderly over young adults, with one perhaps surprising exception: Poland. This finding is confirmed by the 2011 census of Poland where the proportion of Jews under 15 (by a Jewish parents definition) was 5% – as typical of a *terminal* age composition – along

Figure 19. Age of respondents in 12 EU countries, 2018, percentages



Source: FRA 2018 Survey, weighted data.

94 Ben Rafael, Gloeckner, Sternberg, 2011, cit.


95 FRA, 2013, cit.

with a share of 8.6% over 65 – as typical of a *transitional* type.⁹⁶ This apparent anomaly can be explained by the nearly total extermination of Polish Jewry during the Second World War which directly affected today’s older age cohorts. Additionally, it might be related to the Jewish identification data presented later in this chapter, indicating quite a significant inflow of new and younger members to the otherwise small and ageing community. In general, the FRA data on age composition point to a strong tendency to population ageing in nearly all countries, with the partial exceptions of Austria and Belgium where, as already noted, the more religious circles of the Jewish community keep it younger thanks to their higher birth rates.

Conversions to Judaism

Along with the balance of natural increase or decrease and the balance of international migrations, the balance of accessions to and secessions from Judaism also contributes to the overall Jewish population size and composition. Figure 20 shows the self-reported Jewishness of respondents to the 2018 FRA survey. Four categories are represented, including Jewish by birth, Jewish by conversion, Not Jewish, and ‘Unknown.’ The original survey question also addressed denominational divisions within Judaism, but the exact nature of the procedure of conversion to Judaism is not discussed here.

Figure 20. Self-reported personal Jewish status in 12 EU countries, 2018, percentages



Source: FRA 2018 Survey, weighted data.


96 Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2012. *Raport z wyników. Narodowy Spis ludności i mieszkań 2011. Struktura narodowo-etniczna, językowa i wyznaniowa ludności Polski – Narodowy Spis Powszechny ludności i mieszkań 2011*. Warsaw: GUS.

The country with the highest proportion of Jews at birth among respondents is the UK with over 90%. Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands all have more than 80%. Sweden, Hungary, Denmark, Germany and Austria stand at around the 80% mark. Lower percentages around 70% pertain to Spain and Poland. Concurrently with the declining shares of born Jews, one notes a growing share of people reporting to have converted to Judaism. There is no way here to check which type of conversion was performed in each specific case. The remarkable fact is that in countries like Spain and Poland, 20% or more of the total Jewish population affirm to have joined Judaism at some point in their lifetime, and over 10% of joiners, or ‘Jews by choice,’ also appear in Italy, Denmark, Germany and Austria. Most likely these are spouses of Jews who wanted to create a religiously unified family framework, and, in part, their children. Notable

also is the fact that percentages ranging from between a few percentage points to over 10% of non-Jews (and unknowns) decided to participate in a survey that, in its introductory messages and instructions, was explicitly aimed at a Jewish public. This seems to pertain to a broader circle of people who – while acknowledging they are not Jewish – are nevertheless actively involved in cultural and social activities organised by the Jewish community.⁹⁷ Unfortunately, along this strengthening inflow of formal and informal accessions, it is not possible to document the symmetric outflow of secessions, which may offset more or less the demographic dividend of these newcomers.

Another way to illustrate the recent identificational trends among Jewish populations appears in Figure 21.

Figure 21. Percentage other than Jewish^a among respondents to FRA survey in 12 EU countries, comparing their identity when raised and in 2018



^a Sum of: partly Jewish, not Jewish, other.

⁹⁷ Responses were checked to be confident that these people were in some way engaged in Jewish life and not adversarial non-Jews trying to sabotage a Jewish survey.

The data outline the lifetime changes in Jewish belonging by comparing the self-assessed definition first when raised as a child, and second, at the time of the 2018 survey. The contrasts within the different countries are quite striking, with nearly 60% of the respondents from Poland affirming they were raised as something other than Jewish (partly Jewish, not Jewish, or other), but fewer than 20% of the same sample in Poland identifying in that way in 2018 – an absolute lifetime difference of over 40%. This points to a rapid expansion of the Jewish constituency, and appears to be particularly relevant among younger age groups (as shown by the percentage of younger adults in Figure 15). Significant

differences appeared in all other countries between a lack of a clear Jewish identification at birth and in 2018. The smallest difference was obtained in the UK sample, which in any case had the highest rate of Jewishness. Again, these data are unilateral and do not sufficiently elucidate the accessions-secessions balance. But they unquestionably indicate that, in recent years, Judaism has been attracting quite a considerable number of newcomers – not necessarily neophytes in the religious sense, but surely individuals interested in some form of contact and participation with the organised Jewish community which is more intense compared to the one they experienced during their childhood.

6 / Where Europe goes, the Jews of Europe will follow

Development and the Jewish presence

Another important observation about Jewish population change in Europe concerns the general societal context that prevails in each country. Patterns of growth, stability or decline in Jewish population size may reflect not only, as noted above, the dynamics of demographic variables internal to a Jewish population, but also environmental variables shared by Jews and mainstream society in the same place. The main drivers of Jewish population change involve different macro- and micro-societal levels: the existence and response to global geopolitical, socioeconomic and cultural inequalities; national societal contexts and policy interventions; Jewish community contexts and institutional interventions; and personal characteristics, namely age, gender, socioeconomic status, and cultural-identificational profiles.⁹⁸ These variables, alone or combined, impact the rate of growth or decline of a Jewish population in any given country through a complex interplay of push, pull, hold and repel stimuli. Another sensitive indicator is the density of the Jewish presence in a country, as measured through the percentage of Jews out of the total population. The following analysis summarises the relationships that emerge between Jewish and general sociodemographic

factors which operate in contemporary European societies.

Figures 22 and 23 demonstrate the use of *Similarity Structure Analysis* (SSA)⁹⁹ in analysing the relationship between Jewish population size in the different European countries and several other demographic and social indicators. SSA explores the interrelations that exist among large numbers of variables, rather than focusing on explaining only one at a time. SSA computes the correlations between each of the different chosen indicators available for European countries.¹⁰⁰ To explain the concept of correlation further, if two or several countries have identical rankings concerning two different indicators (e.g. life expectancy and educational level of a population), this means that the inherent contents of those two indicators are very similar, and that the two indicators are strongly correlated. If the rankings are different, the correlation between those indicators is weaker or even negative. The SSA software transforms these correlation coefficients – stronger or weaker – into appropriate distances – respectively, shorter or longer – between points on a bidimensional map, each point representing one variable. The emerging visual configurations are helpful in assessing the overall contents of subject matter and its logical partitions. Different

98 DellaPergola, S. 2014. Jewish demography: Fundamentals of the research field, in U. Rebhun (ed.) *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 27, *The Social Scientific Study of Jewry*, 3–36. New York: Oxford University Press.

99 Guttman, L. 1968. A general nonmetric technique for finding the smallest coordinate space for a configuration of points. *Psychometrika*, 33, 4, 469–506; Amar, R., and S. Levy. 2014. SSA-Similarity Structure Analysis, in A.C. Michalos (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Wellbeing Research*, 6306–6313. Dordrecht: Springer.

100 Coefficients of weak monotonicity used in SSA correlations are based on rank orders of variables' values, for example from highest to lowest, and not on the respective actual metric values.


spatial domains detected on a map – each with its own shared homogeneous contents – represent a higher order of generalisation concerning the one or more variables included in each domain.

Figure 22 represents the map of correlations for 13 variables that are available for 33 European countries within the EU and outside it (see also Appendix B, Table B1). It is immediately apparent that the whole set of indicators can be partitioned into three main domains: in the centre are Jewish and population indicators, and on the two sides are variables that act as determinants of growth and determinants of decline. Population indicators include the country's total population, Core Jewish population, and Jews per 1,000 in the country's total population. These can be interpreted as the dependent variables. There exists quite a strong correlation between countries' Jewish and total population sizes, meaning that the largest Jewish populations, such as in France, the UK, Russia and Germany, are found in countries with populations among

the largest in Europe. Those countries, in turn, generally are among the more powerful political and economic actors on the European scene. On the other hand, the rate of Jews per 1,000 in the total population, which measures the intensity of the Jewish presence across countries, and the absolute size of the Jewish population do not necessarily respond in the same way to the same set of determinants.

The left side of the map features a set of general indicators of a country's societal development, such as the Index of Human Development (HDI: a synthetic measure of education, health and income), the average Gross National Income (GNI), the average level of education, life expectancy at birth, the net international migration balance (immigration minus emigration), the natural increase rate (births minus deaths), and the total fertility rate (current average number of children per woman). There is a clearly positive correlation between the principal indicators of a country's higher standard of living (such as

Figure 22. Similarity Structure Analysis of 13 demographic and social indicators for 33 countries in Europe



Source: 2018 FRA Survey, authors' processing, unweighted data. See Appendix Table B1.

higher income, better health, improved human and technological development), and the power of attraction of that country expressed by a surplus of immigrants over emigrants. Perhaps less expected is the high correlation of higher fertility levels and rates of natural increase with other indicators of higher development. Contrary to a situation that may have prevailed earlier in history, higher fertility and the consequent higher birth rates – along with lower death rates associated with higher longevity – contribute nowadays to more rapid population growth. Fertility today is higher in Western than in Eastern Europe, and the same West-East gradient applies to economic development and standard of living. It appears that Jewish population trends, namely growth, stability or decline, are consistent with these more general demographic and socioeconomic patterns, even if at different levels.

Judging from the map, the leading indicators of human development exert some power of attraction towards the two Jewish population indicators of size and proportion per 1,000 inhabitants. In other words, regions and countries characterised by higher societal development seem to constitute a significant factor in regulating the rhythm of Jewish population change in Europe.

On the right side of the map we identify three determinants which, instead, may exert a negative influence on Jewish population size and its share of a country's total population. From top to bottom, the first is an index of antisemitism based on the ADL survey of antisemitic perceptions among the total population. This indicator was built by incorporating all those respondents who agreed with at least six out of eleven antisemitic statements. Notwithstanding reservations about the purely cognitive (and not experiential) nature of this measure, its advantage is that it is available for 102 countries all over the world and therefore it allows for extensive comparisons. A second indicator that correlates quite closely with this is the annual rate of emigration to Israel per 1,000 in the population eligible according to the criteria of the Israeli Law of Return. It stands to reason that the higher the rate of emigration, the stronger the

erosion in Jewish population size. It is also not unexpected to find a strong correlation between a measure of antisemitism and the propensity of Jews to leave a country. However, a stronger relationship of a negative nature seems to exist between Jewish emigration from a country, and the distance of that country from the main indicators of development outlined in the left part of the map. In other words, Jewish emigration from European countries is strongly and inversely correlated with the level of development of the respective countries, at least relative to the 33 countries that underlie the map. A third indicator among the determinants of Jewish population decline is the ratio between the Law of Return population (LRP) and the Core Jewish population (CJP). This is basically an indicator of Jewish assimilation. The higher the ratios, the more numerous are the total population members who have some personal or family-related Jewish background, although they do not personally identify as Jewish unambiguously. Interestingly, this indicator of Jewish identification dispersion, like the indicator of antisemitism mentioned above, stands in a negative correlation with the general indicators of human development.

These findings may be interpreted to the effect that the Jewish presence is enhanced by conditions of higher development, which, in turn, are related to greater tolerance of cultural pluralism and minorities in society. These conditions have come to characterise Western more than Eastern European countries. The cluster of higher development and greater tolerance, in turn, may be assumed to allow for a greater amount of autonomy and self-government on the part of the Jewish community, and hence better opportunities to establish and maintain efficient Jewish services, and higher chances of preserving Jewish identification. The demography of Jewish communities seems to be quite critically affected by the trends just outlined.

Figure 23 repeats a similar data analysis on the basis of 23 EU countries plus the UK, for which one additional variable is available: the 2018 Eurobarometer survey of perceptions of

antisemitism among the general population of the respective countries (see also Appendix Table B2).


The configuration of variables in Figure 23 is very similar to that of Figure 22. Indicators of societal development can be identified with Jewish population growth or at least stability, whereas antisemitism, emigration and assimilation can be identified with Jewish population decline. The somewhat different ordering of the various variables within each of the main domains in the map does not alter its fundamental meaning.

The interesting novelty comes from the additional variable drawn from the 2018 Eurobarometer survey of societal perceptions of antisemitism as a serious issue: this variable appears in the bottom left part of the map, very close to the main indicators of general societal development. We have here a clear indication that concern about antisemitism, at a general population level, is a trait associated with higher development in society. Also, interestingly, concern about antisemitism is strongly correlated and linked

to larger Jewish population size. Moreover, the 2018 Eurobarometer societal concern about antisemitism appears on the opposite side of the map to the 2013 ADL index of antisemitism. In other words, the prevalence of antisemites in a country (according to the ADL) stands in diametrical opposition to the concern about antisemitism in that country (according to the Eurobarometer). Besides being a significant finding likely to enlighten future studies of the perceptions of antisemitism, this also contributes to the explanatory framework of Jewish demographic trends in Europe.

The Jewish demographic experience cannot be understood in isolation from societal and political determinants, as is shown by the peculiar correlations that exist between general sociodemographic and specifically Jewish variables. In other words, the sustainability of Jewish populations and communities has much to do with the development of society in general. The lesson to be kept in mind is that where Europe goes, the Jews of Europe will follow.

Figure 23. Similarity Structure Analysis of 14 demographic and social indicators for 24 EU countries, including the UK



Source: 2018 FRA Survey, authors' processing, unweighted data. See Appendix Table B2.

7 / Concluding remarks

In this report we have presented for the first time a systematic overview of the main demographic trends which affect the size and structure of Jewish populations in Europe. We have provided detailed estimates of the Jewish population size for all countries in Europe and attempted to evaluate it according to several alternative definitions, on the basis of a systematic scanning of all available evidence. We have also outlined the main international migration patterns and the sociodemographic profiles, e.g. distributions by age, marital status and selected Jewish identity characteristics of many Jewish European populations. Besides exploiting all available data sources, we made extensive use of the original findings from the largest Jewish population survey ever undertaken in Europe, the 2018 FRA study of *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism: Second survey of discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*.¹⁰¹

We should stress, however, that the more important step is the in-depth understanding of the nature and determinants of *the trend* in these characteristics, rather than its ultimate product – *the estimate*. Estimates of population size can always be easily corrected and improved in the light of accrued evidence. Trends, on the other hand, operate quite powerfully in the longer term. A demographic trend, relative to each of the several possible determinants of population change, operates under the impact of long-term historical factors, and is a reflection of contemporary circumstances internal or external to the group examined – in our case the Jews. Only under exceptional circumstances do demographic trends radically modify their course, but such modifications have actually occurred more than once in European Jewish demography during the last hundred years alone.

Methodological caveats

Jews were treated in this report as an empirical entity, to be defined and evaluated through the use of data. One problem frequently met in Jewish community discourse concerns the evaluation of Jewish population size from lay leaders, other insiders or external observers through the following doubtful procedure:

Jewish population = (1) the Known + (2) the Known Unknown + (3) the Unknown Unknown

In other words, when there is a concrete figure from a public census or community survey or register, people (correctly) infer from their own circle of acquaintances that there are other more relevant people who have not been included in that count. Once those “known unknowns” have been factored in, the prevailing tendency is to assume that “there must be many more.” In the previous pages we demonstrated how, in fact, in many cases, the figures from an original source need to be inflated, although we also argued for instances where the original figure should be reduced in consideration of the ongoing demographic dynamics. Ideally, serious research should try to get as close as possible to a true situation which is admittedly estimated only as a way of approximation. The essential goal of research is to try to present reality devoid of pre-established narratives or agendas. This also implies a full readiness to correct or revise the data presented if better ones become available.

Further, the users of our data ought to become accustomed to the existence of multiple possible defining boundaries of Jewish and Jewishly-related populations. In earlier sections

101 FRA 2018a, cit.

we chose to present them as a set of nested circles with the core Jewish populations – quite closely aligned with the halachic definition of Jewishness – at the centre, and the Law of Return and distant-origin Jewish populations on the outer margin. Often, controversies concerning the ‘real’ number of Jews arise from a lack of awareness of these various definitions. Numbers reflecting the broadest possible definitions (e.g. the Law of Return definition) may be quoted, for example, without sufficient awareness or explanations of their nature, and understood as reflecting a different, narrower reality of the core Jewish population. As a result, fierce debates about ‘the true and real’ number of Jews can develop between people who operate with two different definitions and effectively talk at cross purposes because of that. For policy purposes, none of the definitions presented here is fundamentally wrong or, on the contrary, absolutely correct. They may all be relevant, provided the users and policy makers are fully aware of the purpose and specific application of choosing a given ‘number of Jews’. Whether a broader or a narrower definition is more appropriate depends on the target audience of the specific policies they plan to enact.

Substantive findings

The demography of contemporary Jews in Europe is the product of the ceaseless momentum of historical circumstances and transformations, as well as of current changes on the broader political, socioeconomic and cultural scene which are bound to affect the future picture. A serious evaluation of the demographic trends of a religio-ethnic community, such as European Jews, requires understanding the overall context of national societies of which they are part, as well as the nature of internal Jewish transnational processes somewhat indifferent to space and time. In turn, Jewish communities, especially when they are sufficiently large, may significantly influence national societal patterns by trying to advance their own corporate interests – for example by advocating policy interventions in defence of their security, civil rights or cultural autonomy.

Summary

Today, European Jewry amounts to about 1.3 million, with two in three people living in one of three countries – France, the United Kingdom or Germany. Viewed from a long-term perspective, the proportion of Jews in Europe today out of the global Jewish population (about 10%) is not very different from the proportion observed about 1000 years ago. The same is true of the proportion of Jews in the total population in Europe: both then and now Jews constitute less than 0.5% of the whole. Jewish demographic history in Europe is not one of continuous peaceful development: in more than one sense, the Jews of Europe followed where the whole of Europe went. Just like others, Jews moved through Europe from the West towards the East up to the nineteenth century, and in the opposite direction thereafter, in pursuit of economic opportunities and greater freedom. When the population pressure in Europe started pushing people towards migration overseas, Jews joined others and created a Diaspora in North and Latin America, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Just as these places represent the extension of European civilisation, so do their Jewish communities represent an extension of Jewish Europe. When nationalist movements formed in Europe, Jews also developed their own movement that started taking them back to Israel – their ancestral place of origin that they had never forgotten. The Second World War resulted in many millions of dead in Europe; Jews, whose losses amounted to six million (more than one in three Jews globally but over 70% of Jews in Europe) are an iconic representation of that war. Thus, the second millennium of the Common Era could be thought of, distinctly, as the European millennium in Jewish history.

Background of demographic events

In the demography of European Jewry – as a broad aggregate or case by case in each country – the crucial fact is whether or not a given single demographic event will occur – be it a marriage, a birth, a death, an incoming immigrant or an outgoing emigrant, or a case of joining or leaving Judaism. Five major variables that operate at the community level determine

the preferred strategies that may or may not lead to the occurrence of that given demographic event: (1) the Jewish communities' unique *traditional culture and organisation*, with special reference to religious and social norms related to the given demographic event, as well as community frameworks and institutions established to implement those norms; (2) the *legal status* of Jews or – more relevant to the contemporary situation – subjective perceptions of the community's own *dependence* or *equality* versus the majority of society or other minorities within it; (3) the Jewish population's *social class stratification*, implying significant inter- and intra-group differences in perceived material or other interests and access to relevant resources; (4) the Jewish population's specific *knowledge* with respect to the given sociodemographic process, whether acquired through formal education or other channels, and the consequent behaviours; and (5) the Jewish population's specific *biological constraints* of a genetic or other nature, namely in relation to inherited health assets or liabilities. Population composition by a variety of personal characteristics is a crucial mediating factor in the causal chain of demographic events. Individual characteristics directly or indirectly reflect the influence of the aforementioned broader determinants that simultaneously shape the lives of many individuals, thus determining the collective profile of a Jewish population.¹⁰²

Taken together, these various factors combined historically in determining distinct differences in the demographic evolution of Jews as against other populations in Europe. These differences were particularly notable in the pace of population growth or decline, in the peculiar geographical concentrations, and in major features of population composition and stratification. On the other hand, the contemporary scene witnessed certain patterns of convergence between Jews and other Europeans – for example concerning expanded higher education, improved health patterns, and frequent intermarriage. At the same

time, group identification tended to become a more crucial determinant of the chances for Jewish continuity and of a Jewish presence at all.

The macro-societal factors

Like other human beings, Jews need good health to survive, good education, the ability to earn and support their family and a decent income to fulfill their immediate needs. The aforementioned chain of determinants led European Jews to make important choices about the places where better environmental conditions would be more supportive to their lives. From our analysis we learned that the Jewish presence in Europe is largely explained and sustained by the general conditions present in society, namely the level of development and the amount of tolerance for Jewish diversity and autonomy. The presence of antisemitic sentiment or, alternatively, the degree of public awareness of the existence of antisemitism as a problematic societal issue, plays an important role in Jewish residential choices.

Continental regional differences

A quite dramatic West-East gradient has emerged in contemporary Europe over the 75 years since the end of the tragedies of the Second World War, and the tribulations of the post-war decades. This is reflected in the updated map of the Jewish presence on the continent. Western Europe was much friendlier than Eastern Europe, and this resulted in a massive abandonment and emptying of vast lands where, throughout history, some of the more important fruits of Jewish culture and social life have grown. The main concentrations of contemporary Jews have found more compatible environments in the major western European democracies such as France, the UK and Germany.

Migrations

Modern Jewish emigration from Europe deeply and selectively affected the numbers and characteristics of those who chose to remain on the continent. The large earlier inflow from former European colonies and protectorates in

102 DellaPergola, 2014, Jewish demography: Fundamentals, cit.

North Africa and the Middle East injected huge quantitative and qualitative new energies into the veteran Jewish population of the continent. The great exodus from the former Soviet Union, in turn, provided a great leap forward for Israeli society and, to a lesser extent, for the Jewish communities in the United States and in Germany. At the same time about 70,000 Israeli-born people currently live in Europe. In major European Jewish communities, the UK, France and Germany, the subpopulations of Israeli-born Jews are the largest in absolute terms (roughly in the range of 10,000–20,000). In other places, particularly in Scandinavia and Southern Europe, Israeli-born populations are smaller in size, but constitute a more significant share of the local Jewish population. Israel, it seems, lends a small part of its vigorous population growth to the Diaspora, thereby, interestingly, contributing to the maintenance of European Diaspora populations. The impact of this phenomenon on European Jewish population sizes ought to be evaluated in full. Based on the most recent data, the surge of Jewish emigration from Europe seen during the 2010s seems to have passed its peak.

An urban population

Although this has not been stressed in the present report, Jews are a nearly totally urbanised population, and most have chosen to live in the main urban concentrations and metropolitan areas. The spatial distribution of Jewish communities regionally and locally is a crucially important topic that will constitute the subject of a separate study. Suffice to say here that the urban character of the Jewish presence implies exposure to a specific set of opportunities and constraints likely to affect in depth the patterns of Jewish communal life.

The family

The historical main engine of Jewish demographic and cultural reproduction has been the family. Just like other Europeans, Jews are a population at an advanced stage of demographic transition. By and large, a significant proportion of Jews of childbearing age are not married, while 44%–72% of Jewish households have just one to two people in them, with the smallest household sizes

observed in Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and the Netherlands, and the largest in Belgium, Spain and the UK. The former group of countries also has high proportions of Jews married to non-Jews, while the latter has a rather low prevalence of intermarriage. These observations lead to the conclusion that low fertility is characteristic of Jews in Europe, with the exception of those countries possessing large populations of strictly Orthodox Jews. Intermarriage, operating on the back of low fertility, complements the picture – these two factors in combination create a situation where the reproductive capacity of many European Jewish populations is low and conducive to future numerical decline.

There are some exceptions to this picture. The Jewish populations of Austria, Belgium, the United Kingdom and possibly Switzerland, all with sizeable strictly Orthodox communities, may be growing, or at least, not declining. The growth of the Jewish populations in Austria and the UK may be aided by migration as well. France, on the other hand, where Jewish fertility is conducive to population stability, is experiencing significant Jewish outmigration. It is quite possible that the future will bring a greater concentration of Jews into fewer places, with some countries (e.g. republics of the former Soviet Union) experiencing further dramatic reductions in Jewish population size, while others consolidate and increase their Jewish populations (e.g. the United Kingdom and Austria).

Intermarriage

Jews have long constituted a highly integrated component of European societies. In spite of past discrimination and persecutions, and notwithstanding the persistence of anti-Jewish prejudice in the population, the participation of Jews in the labour force, in residential neighbourhoods, and in any possible sphere of social interaction is rarely limited. Therefore, the frequent proximity of Jews to non-Jews in similar and compatible environments naturally allows for the formation of frequent interreligious and inter-ethnic friendships and marriage partnerships. The rate of intermarriage is generally high, but significant differences prevail across the continent

and several countries; namely Belgium and the UK, as well as Austria and France display higher internal cohesion and relatively homogeneous social networks and frequent inmarriages. What is more significant is the emerging tendency in several parts of Europe toward a diminished frequency of intermarriage. We have interpreted this either as the consequence of the drift out of the community of its more assimilated fringes, or as the symptom of a process of Jewish de-secularisation and disassimilation. Whatever the real determinants, this is a significant finding which calls for the relevant religious and cultural organisations to seize the opportunities created by more robust Jewish community interaction.

Jewish identity dimensions

This report has not delved into the depth of Jewish identity and other cultural characteristics. It was nonetheless possible to observe a wide intracontinental variation in the preferred modes of adhering to Judaism, whether religious, ethnic or cultural. The frequency of affiliation to Jewish community organisations is highly variable, but besides formal membership, we detected some increase in the attention to Jewish culture and identity among people who formerly were unaware of, or uninterested in their Jewish roots. These fundamental aspects will be explored in further studies.

Jewish community size

On the basis of the collective processing of numerous and different demographic and social indicators, it is possible to reach the perhaps unexpected conclusion that there is a predictable ordering in the data. Among many different possible classification criteria, all European Jewish populations can be regrouped according to one simple criterion, the size of their Jewish population, ordered into three major groups: above 40,000 Jews, between 8,000 and 40,000 Jews, and below 8,000 Jews. This finding quite surprisingly appears to be unaffected by the regional location of European countries and by the heterogeneous nature of the underlying data (illustrated in detail in Appendixes A, B and C).

The basic trait of Jewish community size appears to be the one which is more significantly associated with a large set of other indicators of societal development, demographic dynamics, Jewish organisation, and perceptions of antisemitism by Jews and by the total population. It should be noted that, in this case, the absolute number of Jews counts more than the relative percentage of Jews in a country. This seems to suggest that there are definite thresholds in the performance and viability of Jewish communities. Above a minimal numerical threshold – here operationalised at 8,000 core Jews – it may be possible to organise sufficiently efficient sets of services such as Jewish school networks, care for the elderly, or other types of Jewish social and cultural activities. A higher threshold of 40,000 Jews nationally hints at a level of Jewish public visibility in society that may imply more significant influences in the general economic, cultural, and possibly political life in a given country. These are evidently no more than initial hypotheses to be pursued through more systematic work.

Policy implications

Hopefully this report will stimulate some reflections useful to the development of community policies aimed at achieving better planning of Jewish services and welfare. Clearly no such policies are feasible without an adequate knowledge of the target population, and such assessments must be undertaken with realism and in command of the maximum possible evidence. This report has demonstrated how much can be said with a good margin of confidence but also how much is still missing. A great deal more data collection and in-depth research are required to reach that point on the horizon. The European Jewish Demography Unit at JPR will strive to provide that additional evidence.

/ Appendix A

Jewish and total population estimates and other demographic and social indicators for European countries

The following tables report a set of Jewish and total population estimates and other social and demographic indicators available in full or in

part for 50 countries and territories in Europe. The definition of the European continent is extended to Cyprus and Turkey.

Table A1. Total and Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2020

Country	Total population ^a	Core Jewish population ^b CJP	Jews per 1000 total population	Main source		Population with Jewish parents ^e PJP	Enlarged Jewish population ^f EJP	Law of Return population ^g LRP
				Type ^c	Accuracy rating ^d			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Europe total	829,462,000	1,329,400	1.60			1,819,300	2,325,300	2,820,800
Total European Union 27	445,728,000	788,800	1.77			1,010,500	1,267,800	1,505,700
Austria	8,877,000	10,300	1.16	C,S,J	B 2019	14,000	17,000	20,000
Belgium	11,458,000	29,000	2.53	S,J	C 2018	35,000	40,000	45,000
Bulgaria	6,975,000	2,000	0.29	C,J	C 2011	4,000	6,000	8,000
Croatia	4,055,000	1,700	0.42	C,J	C 2001	2,400	3,100	3,800
Cyprus	1,250,000	300	0.24	C,E	D 2012	400	500	600
Czechia	10,670,000	3,900	0.37	C,J	C 2011	5,000	6,500	8,000
Denmark	5,819,000	6,400	1.10	S,J	C 2018	7,500	8,500	9,500
Estonia	1,328,000	1,900	1.43	C,P	A 2017	2,700	3,500	4,500
Finland	5,521,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2010	1,600	1,900	2,200
France	64,834,000	448,000	6.91	S	B 2018	550,000	650,000	750,000
Germany	83,100,000	118,000	1.42	S,J	B 2018	150,000	225,000	275,000
Greece	10,701,000	4,100	0.38	J	B 2000	5,200	6,000	7,000
Hungary	9,770,000	47,200	4.83	C,S	C 2018	75,000	100,000	130,000
Ireland	4,939,000	2,700	0.55	C	B 2016	3,600	5,000	6,500
Italy	60,345,000	27,300	0.45	S,J	B 2018	34,000	41,000	48,000
Latvia	1,913,000	4,500	2.35	C,P	A 2017	8,000	12,000	16,000
Lithuania	2,787,000	2,400	0.86	C,P	B 2011	4,700	7,500	10,500
Luxembourg	620,000	700	1.13	J	B 2000	900	1,100	1,300
Malta	500,000	100	0.20	E	D 2012	200	300	400

Country	Total population ^a	Core Jewish population ^b CJP	Jews per 1000 total population	Main source		Population with Jewish parents ^e PJP	Enlarged Jewish population ^f EJP	Law of Return population ^g LRP
				Type ^c	Accuracy rating ^d			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Europe total	829,462,000	1,329,400	1.60			1,819,300	2,325,300	2,820,800
Poland	38,400,000	4,500	0.12	C,S,J	C 2018	7,000	10,000	13,000
Portugal	10,269,000	3,100	0.30	C	B 2011	3,500	4,000	5,000
Romania	19,361,000	8,900	0.46	C,J	B 2002	13,000	17,000	20,000
Slovakia	5,454,000	2,600	0.48	C	C 2011	3,600	4,600	6,000
Slovenia	2,088,000	100	0.05	C	C 2003	200	300	400
Spain	47,073,000	13,000	0.28	S,J	C 2020	16,000	19,000	22,000
Sweden	10,286,000	15,000	1.46	S	C 2018	20,000	25,000	30,000
Total other Europe not-FSU^h	181,956,000	330,200	1.81			378,000	425,000	472,100
Albania	2,858,000	100
Andorra	80,000	50
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,493,000	500	0.14	C	C 2001	800	1,100	1,400
Channel Islands	170,000	200	1.18	S	C 2015	300	350	400
Faroe	49,000
Gibraltar	35,000	800	22.86	C,J	B 2019	900	1,000	1,100
Holy See	1,000
Iceland	361,000	50
Kosovo	1,797,000	100
Lichtenstein	39,000	50
Monaco	38,000	700	18.4	S	B 2012	900	1,100	1,300
Montenegro	622,000	100
North Macedonia	2,078,000	100	0.05	C	C 1996	200	300	400
Norway	5,345,000	1,300	0.24	P	B 2010	1,600	2,000	2,500
San Marino	33,000
Serbia	6,945,000	1,400	0.20	C	C 2001	2,100	2,800	3,500
Switzerland	8,572,000	18,500	2.16	C	B 2012	22,000	25,000	28,000
Turkey ⁱ	82,607,000	14,600	0.18	S,J	B 2016	19,000	21,000	23,000
United Kingdom ⁱ	66,833,000	292,000	4.37	C,S	B 2018	330,000	370,000	410,000
Total FSU Republics not-EU	201,778,000	210,400	1.04			430,800	632,500	843,000
Belarus	9,467,000	8,500	0.90	C	B 2009	17,000	25,000	33,000
Moldova	3,543,000	1,900	0.54	C	B 2014	3,800	7,500	10,000
Russia ⁱ	146,731,000	155,000	1.06	C	C 2010	320,000	460,000	600,000
Ukraine	42,037,000	45,000	1.07	C	C 2001	90,000	140,000	200,000

A) Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau (2019) and United Nations (2018). Mid-year 2018 estimates.

B) Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; and do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity.

C) Type f source: (C) National population census. (P) National population register. (S) Survey of Jewish population. (J) Jewish community register. (E) Estimate.

D) Accuracy rating: (A) Base estimate derived from national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. (B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period. (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or less reliable or partial coverage of country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends. (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. The year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates was obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment.

E) Sum of (A) core Jewish population; (B) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (C) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent.

F) Sum of (A) core Jewish population; (B) persons reported as partly Jewish; (C) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (D) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.).

G) Sum of Jews, children of Jews, grandchildren of Jews, and all respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identification.

H) Including estimates for countries and territories with fewer than 100 core Jews each.

I) Including the Isle of Man.

J) Including Asian regions.

K) Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU.

Table A2. Selected social and demographic indicators, Jewish population

Country	Core Jewish pop. rank World ^a	Core Jewish pop. rank Europe ^a	Ratio LRP/CJP ^b 2020	Immigrants to Israel N 2019 ^c	Aliyah rate per 1000 CJP 2019 ^d	Aliyah rate per 1000 LRP 2019 ^e	Born in country, in Israel 2008 ^f	Country of origin, in Israel 2008 ^f	Israel born, living in country 2011 ^g	Antisemitism ADL % 2014 ^h	Antisemitism Eurobarometer % 2018 ⁱ
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Europe total		2.12	26,750	20.1	9.5	1,042,375^j	1,972,460ⁱ	69,715			
Total European Union 27		1.91	3,000	3.8	2.0	286,360	776,590	48,163			
Austria	24	14	1.94	23	2.2	1.2	4,750	15,410	2,049	28	47
Belgium	16	8	1.55	95	3.3	2.1	5,370*	11,220*	3,368	27	50
Bulgaria	48	26	4.00	7	3.5	0.9	16,200	39,840	337	44	10
Croatia	52	29	2.24	1	0.6	0.3	3,460*	8,240*	100	33	28
Cyprus	74–75	37	2.00	27	90.0	45.0	1,610*	3,940*	296	..	14
Czechia	37	21	2.05	14	3.6	1.8	10,220*	32,940*	547	13	28
Denmark	31	17	1.48	6	0.9	0.6	1,580*	2,410*	1,637	9	43
Estonia	49–51	27–28	2.37	7	3.7	1.6	*	*	44	22	6
Finland	56–57	31–32	1.69	11	8.5	5.0	600	840	708	15	17
France	3	1	1.67	2,209	4.9	2.9	36,530*	62,320*	8,845	37	72
Germany	8	4	2.33	161	1.4	0.6	21,920	65,560	10,410	27	66
Greece	36	20	1.71	7	1.7	1.0	2,920	13,000	737	69	24
Hungary	12	5	2.75	42	0.9	0.3	11,730	36,560	1,179	41	45
Ireland	41	23	2.41	3	1.1	0.5	480	860	397	20	21
Italy	17	9	1.76	70	2.6	1.5	5,210	10,870	3,065	20	58
Latvia	34–35	18	3.56	80	17.8	5.0	4,060*	7,770*	94	28	14
Lithuania	45	25	4.38	43	17.9	4.1	3,690	11,550	18	36	20
Luxembourg	64–65	34	1.86	3	4.3	2.3	*	*	129	..	19
Malta	82–101	39–41	4.00	4	40.0	10.0	*	*	12	..	18
Netherlands	15	7	2.11	46	1.5	0.7	4,570	9,330	6,029	5	65
Poland	34–35	19	2.89	24	5.3	1.8	57,220	213,540	489	45	41

Country	Core Jewish pop. rank World ^a	Core Jewish pop. rank Europe ^a	Ratio LRP/CJP ^b 2020	Immigrants to Israel N 2019 ^c	Aliyah rate per 1000 CJP 2019 ^d	Aliyah rate per 1000 LRP 2019 ^e	Born in country, in Israel 2008 ^f	Country of origin, in Israel 2008 ^f	Israel born, living in country 2011 ^g	Antisemitism ADL % 2014 ^h	Antisemitism Eurobarometer % 2018 ⁱ
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Europe total			2.12	26,750	20.1	9.5	1,042,375^j	1,972,460ⁱ	69,715		
Total European Union 27			1.91	3,000	3.8	2.0	286,360	776,590	48,163		
Portugal	38	22	1.61	5	1.6	1.0	270	520	156	21	10
Romania	27	15	2.25	3	0.3	0.2	95,760	222,790	1,594	35	23
Slovakia	42	24	2.31	0	0.0	0.0	*	*	109	..	20
Slovenia	82-101	39-41	4.00	0	0.0	0.0	*	*	42	27	16
Spain	23	13	1.69	84	6.5	3.8	1,540	4,880	3,425	29	22
Sweden	21	11	2.00	25	1.7	0.8	1,420	2,200	2,347	4	81
Total other Europe not-FSU^k			1.43	739	2.2	1.6	50,160	128,760	21,552		
Albania	102+	42-50	..	3	*	*
Andorra	102+	42-50	..	0
Bosnia-Herzegovina	67-70	36	2.80	1	2.0	0.7	*	*	..	32	..
Channel Islands	76-81	38	2.00	0
Faroe	102+	42-50	..	0
Gibraltar	63	33	1.38	0	0.0	0.0
Holy See	102+	42-50	..	0
Iceland	102+	42-50	..	0	*	*	30	16	..
Kosovo	102+	42-50	..	0	*	*
Lichtenstein	102+	42-50	..	0
Monaco	64-65	35	1.86	5	7.1	3.8	*	*
Montenegro	102+	42-50	..	0	*	*	..	29	..
North Macedonia	82-101	39-41	4.00	1	10.0	2.5	230*	830*

Country	Core Jewish pop. rank World ^a	Core Jewish pop. rank Europe ^a	Ratio LRP/CJP ^b 2020	Immigrants to Israel N 2019 ^c	Aliyah rate per 1000 CJP 2019 ^d	Aliyah rate per 1000 LRP 2019 ^e	Born in country, in Israel 2008 ^f	Country of origin, in Israel 2008 ^f	Israel born, living in country 2011 ^g	Antisemitism ADL % 2014 ^h	Antisemitism Eurobarometer % 2018 ⁱ
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Europe total		2.12	26,750	20.1	9.5	1,042,375^j	1,972,460^j	69,715			
Total European Union 27		1.91	3,000	3.8	2.0	286,360	776,590	48,163			
San Marino	102+	41–50	
Serbia	55	30	2.50	6	4.3	*	*	..	42	..	
Switzerland	18	10	1.51	67	3.6	3,680	7,640	2,522	26	..	
Turkey	22	12	1.58	157	10.8	26,590	80,610	..	69	..	
United Kingdom ^l	5	2	1.40	497	1.7	19,660	39,680	18,240	8	62	
Total FSU Republics not-EU		4.01	23,011	109.4	27.3	165,855	331,400				
Belarus	28	16	3.88	919	108.1	23,200	26,930	
Moldova	49–51	27–28	5.26	156	82.1	10,600	12,720	..	30	..	
Russia	7	3	3.87	15,759	101.7	105.47	139,780	..	30	..	
Ukraine	13	6	4.44	6,177	137.3	131,950	151,970	..	38	..	
[Total FSU in Europe]^m		3.99	23,141	105.6	26.5	173,605	350,720				
[Soviet Union unspecified]						540,000	735,710				

A) Ranked from largest to smallest, Source: Table A1.

B) An index of assimilation: the higher the value, the higher the estimated impact of intermarriage. Source: Table A1.

C) Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

D) New immigrants to Israel divided by Core Jewish population, see Table A1.

E) New Immigrants to Israel divided by Law of Return population, see Table A1.

F) Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2008*, unpublished data. Col. 7: born in country; Col. 8: including born in Israel, father born in country. *Belgium incl. Luxembourg; Croatia incl. Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Kosovo; Cyprus incl. Malta; Czechia incl. Slovakia; Denmark incl. Norway, Iceland; France incl. Monaco; Latvia incl. Estonia. ** Not accounting for 540,000 persons born, and 735,710 persons born in Israel with father born in the Soviet Union.

G) Source: for Israelis by country of birth for all countries except Belgium, Ireland, Lithuania and the Netherlands: European Commission, Eurostat, *2011 Population and Housing Census Database of Europe*. The Netherlands, people born in Israel with at least one Israeli born parent permanently living in the country. CBS-Netherlands, 2019. Belgium, people born in Israel and permanently living in the country, StatBel, 2019. Ireland: Jews born in Israel, 2016. Lithuania: Israeli-born permanently resident in country. Statistics Lithuania, 2015.

H) Source: ADL – Anti Defamation League. 2014. *ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-semitism*. New York: ADL.

I) Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers. 2019. *Perceptions of antisemitism. Report. Public. Special Eurobarometer, 484*. Brussels: Kantar.

J) Including 540,000 persons born in the former Soviet Union and 735,710 persons born in Israel with father born in the former Soviet Union.

K) Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU.

L) Including the Isle of Man.

Country	Country HDI 2018 ^a	Country HDI rank world 2018 ^a	Life expectancy at birth 2018 ^a	Total fertility rate 2019 ^b	Birth - Death rate p. 1000 2019 ^b	Migration rate net p.1000 2015–20 ^c	Mean years of schooling 2018 ^a	Gross national income \$ p.c. ^a
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Total other Europe not-FSU								
Iceland	0.938	6	83.3	1.7	5.0	1.1	12.7	44,097
Kosovo	1.6	8.0
Lichtenstein	0.917	18	80.5	1.4	2.0	..	12.5	99,732
Monaco	1.5	-1.0
Montenegro	0.816	52	76.8	1.8	1.0	-0.8	11.4	17,511
North Macedonia	0.759	82	75.7	1.4	1.0	-0.5	9.7	12,874
Norway	0.953	1	82.3	1.6	3.0	5.3	12.8	68,059
San Marino	1.3	0.0
Serbia	0.799	63	75.8	1.5	-5.0	0.5	11.2	15,218
Switzerland	0.946	2	83.6	1.5	2.0	6.1	13.4	59,375
Turkey	0.806	59	77.4	2.0	10.0	3.5	7.7	24,905
United Kingdom ^d	0.920	15	81.2	1.7	2.0	3.9	13.0	39,507
Total FSU Republics not-EU								
Belarus	0.817	50	74.6	1.6	-3.0	0.9	12.3	17,039
Moldova	0.711	107	71.8	1.2	-1.0	-0.3	11.6	6,833
Russia	0.824	49	72.4	1.6	-2.0	1.3	12.0	25,036
Ukraine	0.750	88	72.0	1.4	-6.0	0.2	11.3	7,994
Lower status measures ^e	<0.800	>50	<78	<1.5	<0.0	<0.0	<10	<20,000

A) Source: United Nations, Human Development Programme UNDP. 2020. *Human Development Report 2019. Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century*. New York: UNDP.

B) Source: Population Reference Bureau. 2019. *World Population Data Sheet*. Washington, DC, PRB.

C) Source: United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 2019, File MIGR/1: Net migration rate by region, subregion and country, 1950–2100 (per 1,000 population)*. New York: UNPD.

D) Including Isle of Man.

E) Lower status measures highlighted in the table.

/ Appendix B

Interrelations between selected Jewish and general demographic and social indicators for European countries

In the following tables we present two matrixes of correlations between selected demographic and social indicators referring to the total and Jewish populations of European countries. The countries selected are those for which the full set of indicators is available. The original data are reported in Appendix A, Tables A1, A2, and A3. The measures reported here are coefficients of weak monotonicity which reflect the *ranking* of the various indicators by countries, rather than their actual *metric values*. The advantage of such a procedure is that it is not affected by the huge diversity of the measurement units of the quite heterogeneous variables used in the

table, nor by the large gaps that exist within some of the variables.

Table B1 shows correlation coefficients, represented as percent values, for 13 variables available for 33 European countries, 23 in the EU and 10 outside it, including the UK. The reason 23 and not 27 EU countries are included is because one of the indicators, the ADL survey of antisemitism, was not available for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia. The stronger correlation coefficients have been graphically stressed in the table, positive coefficients in yellow, negative coefficients in blue.

Table B1 and B2 legend

Tot. p. Total population of country, 2020

Jew. p Core Jewish population of country, 2020

P.1000 Core Jewish population per 1,000 total population of country, 2020

R/C Ratio of Law of Return Population to Core Jewish Population, 2020

Aliya Number of new immigrants to Israel, 2019

HDI Country's Index of Human Development, 2018

L. exp Country's life expectancy at birth, 2018

TFR Country's total fertility rate, 2018

N. inc Country's natural increase rate per 1,000 population, 2018

N. mig Country's net international migration rate per 1,000 population, 2018

Edu Mean years of education attained by country's population aged 15+, 2018

GNI Country's average Gross National Income in US \$, 2018

ADL ADL survey of frequency of "antisemites" among country's population, 2013, percent

EBM Eurobarometer survey of country's population perceptions of antisemitism as serious problem in 2018, percent

Table B1. Coefficients of weak monotonicity between selected indicators, 33 European countries

Variable	Tot. p 1	Jew. p 2	P.1000 3	LR/C 13	Aliya 4	HDI 5	L. exp 6	TFR 7	N. inc 8	N. mig 9	Edu 10	GNI 11	ADL 12
1 Tot. p	x	93	42	-14	65	-10	-16	36	34	48	-30	-6	29
2 Jew. p	93	x	96	-50	23	37	31	72	46	45	30	36	-16
3 P.1000	42	96	X	-43	-24	44	28	59	22	24	52	43	-20
13 LR/C	-14	-50	-43	x	84	-82	-93	-39	-75	-74	26	-84	37
4 Aliya	65	23	-24	84	x	-85	-90	-25	-48	-19	-20	-84	45
5 HDI	-10	37	44	-82	-85	x	95	57	61	76	74	x	-79
6 L. exp	-16	31	28	-93	-90	95	x	25	69	76	9	95	-60
7 TFR	36	72	59	-39	-25	57	25	x	79	52	25	60	-9
8 N. inc	34	46	22	-75	-48	61	69	79	x	84	-13	77	-19
9 N. mig	48	45	24	-74	-19	76	76	52	84	x	33	85	-52
10 Edu	-30	30	52	26	-20	74	9	25	-13	33	x	71	-69
11 GNI	-6	36	43	-84	-84	x	95	60	77	85	71	x	-81
12 ADL	29	-16	-20	37	45	-79	-60	-9	-19	-52	-69	-81	x

≥ ± 60% coloured. ≥ ± 85% outlined. Positive coefficients in yellow, negative coefficients in blue.

Source: 2018 FRA Survey, authors' processing, unweighted data.

Table B2. Percent coefficients of weak monotonicity between selected indicators, 24 EU countries including the UK

Variable	Tot. p 1	Jew. p 2	P.1000 3	LR/C 14	Aliya 4	HDI 5	L. exp 6	TFR 7	N. inc 8	N. mig 9	Edu 10	GNI 11	ADL 12	EBM 13
1 Tot. p	X	97	60	-67	-5	41	70	-8	27	57	-3	36	-7	84
2 Jew. p	97	x	98	-84	8	48	70	81	72	50	22	54	-8	96
3 P.1000	60	98	x	-40	1	18	5	72	38	19	34	34	-4	80
14 LR/C	-67	-84	-40	x	7	-62	-88	18	-69	-80	56	-66	54	-70
4 Aliya	-5	8	1	7	x	-12	-3	-29	-33	-60	-32	-17	-5	-50
5 HDI	41	48	18	-62	-12	x	87	68	94	89	64	99	-83	72
6 L. exp	70	70	5	-88	-3	87	x	4	85	85	-49	87	-54	69
7 TFR	-8	81	72	18	-29	68	4	x	76	40	82	70	-56	45
8 N. inc	27	72	38	-69	-33	94	85	76	x	85	40	94	-77	61
9 N. mig	57	50	19	-80	-60	89	85	40	85	x	25	90	-67	71
10 Edu	-3	22	34	56	-32	64	-49	82	40	25	x	56	-46	30
11 GNI	36	54	34	-66	-17	99	87	70	94	90	56	x	-85	76
12 ADL	-7	-8	-4	54	-5	-83	-54	-56	-77	-67	-46	-85	x	-48
13 EBM	84	96	80	-70	-50	72	69	45	61	71	30	76	-48	X

≥ ± 60% coloured. ≥ ± 85% outlined. Positive coefficients in yellow, negative coefficients in blue.

Source: 2018 FRA Survey, authors' processing, unweighted data.

Table B2 shows correlation coefficients, represented as percent values, for 14 variables available for 23 EU countries plus the UK. The new variable is the 2018 Eurobarometer survey of antisemitism which measures perceptions of Jews among the total population. As noted above, four EU countries were not included because the data of the 2013 ADL survey on antisemitism in society were not available. The main findings are

similar to those of Table B1. One new interesting finding is the high correlation between Jews per 1,000 total population, and perceptions of antisemitism as a serious issue by the total population of the same country. A more visible Jewish population is associated with greater sensitivity by the total population about the seriousness of antisemitism, implying a more benign attitude to Jews held by non-Jews.


/ Appendix C

Configurations of European countries based on interrelations between demographic and social indicators

In this section we present Structural Similarity Analyses of the configuration of European countries based on the interrelations between demographic social and data presented in Appendix A. The same procedure is followed as displayed in **Figures 22 and 23** above, except that by shifting the order of countries and variables, the dependent variable here

is the countries rather than the different socio-demographic variables reported in Appendix B. Figure C1 shows the SSA map of 33 European countries within and outside the EU for which the respective rankings can be compared on a set of 13 Jewish and general demographic and social indicators, as shown in Appendix B.

Figure C1. Configuration of 33 European countries, based on interrelations between 13 selected demographic and social indicators



Key to countries: AT Austria, BE Belgium, BG Bulgaria, BH Bosnia Herzegovina, BL Belarus, CH Switzerland, CZ Czechia, DK Denmark, DE Germany, EE Estonia, EL Greece, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, HR Croatia, HU Hungary, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LV Latvia, LT Lithuania, MO Moldova, NL The Netherlands, NO Norway, PL Poland, PT Portugal, RO Romania, RU Russia, SE Sweden, SI Slovenia, SR Serbia, TU Turkey, UA Ukraine, UK United Kingdom.


Source: 2018 FRA Survey, authors' processing, unweighted data. See Appendix Tables A1, A2, A3.

The map displays different clusters of countries. The upper left corner comprises six countries: France, the UK, Hungary, Russia, Germany and Ukraine. Four are EU members, two are former Soviet republics. From the respective social indicators there is little that these six countries seem to have in common besides the fact that all have a core Jewish population above 40,000. Looking at the central part of the map, a second group of 8 countries can somehow be constructed attracting attention: Turkey, Italy, Romania, Spain, Belarus, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. All of these countries have a core Jewish population of between 8,000 and 40,000. Two other countries, the Netherlands and Sweden which would fit the same cluster of Jewish population size, appear out of range. All the remaining 17 countries in the map have a core Jewish population of less than 8,000. In other words, the main partition

is above or below 40,000 Jews, but there may be other affinities among smaller communities.

In Figure C2, the data processing was repeated with the same technique over a set of 24 EU countries, including the UK, for which one additional variable was available: the 2018 Eurobarometer survey of perceptions of antisemitism among the general population of the respective countries. All in all, the configuration of countries in Figure C2 is nearly identical to that of Figure C1. Four countries with the larger Jewish populations appear in the upper left corner: France, the UK, Germany and Hungary. Seven more countries, this time including the Netherlands and Sweden, all have core Jewish populations between 8,000 and 40,000. The other 13 EU countries all have Jewish populations below 8,000. The clustering by Jewish population size appears reinforced and clearer here.

Figure C2. Configuration of 24 EU countries including the UK, based on interrelations between 14 selected demographic and social indicators



Key to countries: AT Austria, BE Belgium, BG Bulgaria, CZ Czechia, DK Denmark, DE Germany, EE Estonia, EL Greece, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, HR Croatia, HU Hungary, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LV Latvia, LT Lithuania, NL The Netherlands, PL Poland, PT Portugal, RO Romania, SE Sweden, SI Slovenia, UK United Kingdom.

Source: 2018 FRA Survey, authors' processing, unweighted data. See Appendix Tables A1, A2, A3.

/ Appendix D

The 2018 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Survey of Antisemitism

This report intensively used data collected in the second survey of Jewish people's experiences and perceptions of hate crime, discrimination and antisemitism, undertaken in 2018 at the initiative of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).¹⁰³ The 2018 FRA survey built on the experience and methodology developed for the 2012 FRA survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews which covered 9 EU Member States: France, the UK, Germany, Hungary, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Latvia and Romania. Data for Romania were omitted in the final analysis because they were of poor quality.¹⁰⁴ The conceptual infrastructure was largely provided by an academic advisory committee which included several leading specialists on issues of contemporary European Jewry convened and managed in 2012 by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

In 2017, the FRA initiated a stakeholders' consultation in Vienna to elaborate the feasibility plan for a new study to be conducted in 2018 in 13 countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Countries were selected for the study primarily because of their larger Jewish population size, but also in view of their locations in the different regions of the continent: north, south, east and west. The 12 EU countries covered correspond to 97% of the EU core Jewish population estimated at above one million in 2018.¹⁰⁵ The data for

Latvia were omitted from the final analysis because of poor quality. An expanded academic committee reflecting the larger number of participating countries advised on the design and implementation of this survey. The 2018 FRA survey used data from 16,395 self-identified Jewish respondents (aged 16 or over) in 12 EU Member States.

In preparation for the 2018 survey, the 2012 survey questionnaire went through a review which resulted in changes to some of the questions. Steps to reduce the survey length were taken, with a view to minimising the burden on respondents. This included reviewing possible questions for deletion and reducing the number of items and answer categories in individual questions. Some questions were deleted and some were streamlined, rephrased or repositioned in the questionnaire to improve the flow when answering the questions. The questionnaire was also revised to establish a design compatible across most common, latest operating systems (such as Microsoft Windows, Apple's iOS, Linux) and that could also work on different types of devices, including desktop and laptop computers, tablets and smartphones, all of which could be used for completing the survey. Questionnaire revisions aimed to retain comparability with the 2012 survey to the extent possible. The 2018 survey questionnaire is available in a separate report.¹⁰⁶

103 The main results were published in FRA 2018a, cit.

104 FRA, 2013, cit.

105 DellaPergola, 2019, cit.

106 FRA, 2018b, cit.

The survey collected data through an open online survey which was available to respondents to complete during seven weeks in May-June 2018. Eligible participants were all those who self-defined as Jews, were aged 16 or over and resident in one of the survey countries. The questionnaire was administered online and could be accessed via an open web link that was publicised by a wide variety of Jewish organisations, Jewish media outlets and social networks, as well as on the FRA website. People who had connected with the survey were asked to forward the web link to Jewish acquaintances who might not have been aware of it. The most marginal and disconnected parts of the Jewish population may not have heard about the survey or may have chosen not to complete it. Nevertheless, information collected about community affiliation of respondents provided a reasonable sense of confidence that the survey did reach the peripheral fringes of the Jewish public.¹⁰⁷ In some countries the participation of Jews belonging to the haredi sectors of the Jewish community may have been lower than average.

A consortium of Ipsos and the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR), both based in the United Kingdom, won the tender to conduct the survey, and managed it under the administrative supervision of FRA staff. The study was directed by Ioannis Dimitrakopoulos, Head of Equality and Citizens' Rights Department at FRA, and managed by Vida Beresneviciute from the organisation's Research and Data Unit. Appreciation is due to Michael O'Flaherty, Director of the FRA in Vienna. The academic advisory group that JPR assembled to work on the study, besides the authors of this report, included: Prof. Eliezer Ben-Rafael (Tel Aviv University, Israel), Prof. Michal Bilewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland), Prof. Chantal Bordes-Benayoun (National Centre for Scientific Research, France), Dr. Jonathan Boyd (JPR/Institute for Jewish Policy Research, United Kingdom), Prof. Lars Dencik (Roskilde University, Denmark), Dr. Olaf Glöckner (Moses

Mendelssohn Zentrum, Germany), Dr. Erich Griessler (Institute for Advanced Studies, Austria), Prof. András Kovács (Central European University, Hungary), Dr. Hannah van Solinge (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute), Dr. Mark Tolts (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel), and Dr. Martina Weisz (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel). Richard Goldstein at JPR in London coordinated contacts with European Jewish communities aimed at enhancing data collection.

JPR collected information on the size and composition of the Jewish population in each country, and on Jewish community structures in the European countries involved; identified ways to raise awareness about the survey among Jews in the selected countries; and created and implemented the communications strategy for the endeavour in each country. Ipsos ensured the technical set-up of the survey, including the translation of all survey materials, the development of the survey website and compliance with all data security, privacy and confidentiality standards. The two organisations worked very closely together throughout the project, to advise and support one another in their respective tasks, and to provide regular extensive verbal and written reports to the FRA.

Throughout data collection, responses were monitored using the online tool provided by Ipsos. This allowed monitoring of response levels on a daily basis, and enabled the central JPR team to observe the impact of particular communications campaigns by different organisations across the survey countries and to check the distributions of responses by age, sex, geography and Jewish affiliation in order to assess how the communications campaigns were reaching different segments of the target population and to amend the approach accordingly. Because of the voluntary and self-selected nature of respondents, the sample cannot be considered strictly representative in the way a random probabilistic sample of the target population would be.

107 Staetsky, 2019a, cit.

However, comparisons between the survey results and Jewish population distributions by age, sex and major geographical region available from other national and Jewish community sources showed relatively modest amounts of bias. For the purpose of the description of population characteristics, the sample was weighted according to the distributions in those other sources.

The data collection outcomes confirmed the experience of similar online surveys: that the launch day is critical. In this case, over 4,000 responses were obtained on the first day alone, constituting nearly a quarter of the total sample. Following the processes undertaken to assess the quality of the data and cleaning of the dataset, the final dataset included 16,395

completed questionnaires across the 12 valid survey countries without Latvia. The average time for survey completion was 33 minutes, and the median duration was 27 minutes.

The response level in 2018 was significantly higher than in 2012. In the seven countries where data can be compared for both dates, the number of valid respondents increased from 5,663 in 2012 to 13,083 in 2018, an increase of 131% or more than double. The number of respondents increased especially in France (+233%), the UK (+222%), Germany (+103%), Belgium (+79%), and Sweden (+47%). Such improved coverage of the Jewish population testifies to much more efficient advertising of the survey, enhanced access to the internet, and possibly a greater awareness of, and interest in the topics investigated.

Table D1. Sample size in FRA 2012 and 2018 surveys^a

Country	2018	2012	% change 2012–2018	Core Jewish population 31/12/2018	2018 % ratio respondents/ population
Grand total	16,395	5,663	=	1,041,200	1.6
Comparable total	13,083	5,663	131.0	978,800	1.3
Austria	526	=	=	10,000	5.3
Belgium	785	438	79.2	29,100	2.7
Denmark	592	=	=	6,400	9.1
France	3,869	1,162	233.0	450,000	0.9
Germany	1,233	608	102.8	118,000	1.0
Hungary	590	528	11.7	47,300	1.2
Italy	682	649	5.1	27,400	2.5
The Netherlands	1,202	=	=	29,800	4.0
Poland	422	=	=	4,500	9.4
Spain	570	=	=	11,700	4.9
Sweden	1,193	810	47.3	15,000	8.0
United Kingdom	4,731	1,468	222.3	292,000	1.6

^a Not including data collected in Romania in 2012 and in Latvia in 2012 and 2018.

Source: FRA, 2013, cit.; FRA, 2018a, cit.; DellaPergola, S. 2020. *Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A New Structural Look*. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The Vidal Sassoon Center for the Study of Antisemitism, and Berlin: De Gruyter, ACTA, 2020.

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